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Abstract
This dissertation is on topics in behavioral economics. It contains two chapters that are methodologically
and topically distinct.
The first chapter is entitled “Quitting: The Downside of Great Expectations in Competitions.” This research
examines ranked professional athletes who compare themselves with their opponents. Athletes with
better rankings than their competitors are called “favorites” and are expected to win. Athletes with worse
rankings than their competitors are called “underdogs” and are expected to lose. Favorites enjoy many
advantages over other competitors, but this chapter demonstrates that favorites are also more likely to
quit in competition than underdogs. This is particularly true when competitors face adversity. When
favorites begin to lose, they may attempt to save face by quitting, and thereby manage the impressions
that others form of them. This chapter reports on an analysis of 328,425 men’s professional tennis
matches and demonstrates that favorites are discontinuously more likely to quit mid-match than
underdogs. It also contains results from surveys and interviews of athletes that support an impression
management account for the observed quitting pattern.
The second chapter in this dissertation is entitled “The Role of Incentive Salience in Habit Formation.”
This research consists of analysis of data from a behavioral intervention related to exercise. In this
intervention, pedometer wearers received incentives for every step they took over the course of a two
week period. Users were randomly assigned to a “salient” condition, in which incentives were announced
and explained in repeated emails, and a “non-salient” condition, in which information about incentives
could be easily accessed, but was not sent to users via email. The purpose of the experiment was to
compare the average daily steps in the “salient” and the “non-salient” conditions after the intervention
period concluded to determine if longer-lasting post-intervention walking habits were induced when
enhanced incentives were highlighted. Results indicate that the salience manipulation was successful
and led to greater daily steps during the intervention, and to habits that persisted after the end of the
intervention.
Together, the chapters in this dissertation contribute to the substantial and growing literature on
individual decision making.
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ABSTRACT

ESSAYS IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
Bradford Tuckfield
Professor Katherine L. Milkman

This dissertation is on topics in behavioral economics. It contains two chapters
that are methodologically and topically distinct.
The first chapter is entitled “Quitting: The Downside of Great Expectations in
Competitions.” This research examines ranked professional athletes who compare
themselves with their opponents. Athletes with better rankings than their competitors are
called “favorites” and are expected to win. Athletes with worse rankings than their
competitors are called “underdogs” and are expected to lose. Favorites enjoy many
advantages over other competitors, but this chapter demonstrates that favorites are also
more likely to quit in competition than underdogs. This is particularly true when
competitors face adversity. When favorites begin to lose, they may attempt to save face
by quitting, and thereby manage the impressions that others form of them. This chapter
reports on an analysis of 328,425 men’s professional tennis matches and demonstrates
that favorites are discontinuously more likely to quit mid-match than underdogs. It also
contains results from surveys and interviews of athletes that support an impression
management account for the observed quitting pattern.
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The second chapter in this dissertation is entitled “The Role of Incentive Salience
in Habit Formation.” This research consists of analysis of data from a behavioral
intervention related to exercise. In this intervention, pedometer wearers received
incentives for every step they took over the course of a two week period. Users were
randomly assigned to a “salient” condition, in which incentives were announced and
explained in repeated emails, and a “non-salient” condition, in which information about
incentives could be easily accessed, but was not sent to users via email. The purpose of
the experiment was to compare the average daily steps in the “salient” and the “nonsalient” conditions after the intervention period concluded to determine if longer-lasting
post-intervention walking habits were induced when enhanced incentives were
highlighted. Results indicate that the salience manipulation was successful and led to
greater daily steps during the intervention, and to habits that persisted after the end of the
intervention.
Together, the chapters in my dissertation contribute to the substantial and growing
literature on individual decision making.
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CHAPTER 1

Quitting: The Downside of Great Expectations in Competitions
Joint work with: Berkeley Dietvorst, Prof. Katherine L. Milkman, and Prof. Maurice E.
Schweitzer
Abstract for Chapter 1
Competition is pervasive in organizations, and it is a powerful force that shapes many
decisions. We study how performance expectations in competitive environments
influence persistence. Specifically, we highlight a sharp distinction between favorites
(competitors who are expected to win) who enter competitions with high performance
expectations and underdogs (competitors who are expected to lose). Because favorites
enjoy a host of advantages over underdogs including greater self-efficacy, it would be
natural to predict that favorites will be more persistent in competitions than underdogs.
However, we theorize that when favorites confront the possibility of an expectationviolating loss, some may prefer to quit in order to create ambiguity about the underlying
cause of their weak performance. We employ a regression discontinuity design to study
this phenomenon with a dataset of 328,425 professional men’s tennis matches and show
that all other things being equal, assigning competitors the classification of “favorite”
leads them to quit competitions at a higher rate than assigning them the classification of
“underdog.” Consistent with our theory of quitting as an impression management tool,
the causal effect we identify of being a favorite in competition on reduced persistence is
moderated by early performance in a competition – weaker initial performance in a
competition (signaling a probable loss) increases the size of the difference between
favorites’ and underdogs’ likelihood of quitting. We discuss the practical implications of
this phenomenon for individuals and organizations.

1

INTRODUCTION
Within and between organizations, competition is pervasive. Individuals routinely
compete for resources and status (Kilduff et al. 2010; Pierce, Kilduff, Galinsky, and
Sivanathan, in press; Deutsch, 1949; Chan, Li, and Pierce, 2014). Not only is competition
common, but it is also often necessary and valuable. Competition can guide markets to
reach equilibria, help organizations identify their most qualified employees, and help
managers allocate resources efficiently (Stigler, 1957; Beersma et al., 2003).
Competition, however, is not just a means to an end; it has a profound impact on
those involved. Competition occurs within a social context and is “inherently relational”
(Kilduff et al., 2010, p. 961). It is such a powerful force that it consistently and
predictably shapes actors’ decisions (Pierce, Kilduff, Galinsky, and Sivanathan, 2014).
The experience of competition is influenced by competitors’ relationships, not only with
each other, but also with supporters and other observers. As a result, social constructs
such as expectations are likely to shape both competitive processes and competitive
outcomes.
Many competitions involve a favorite, an individual who is expected to win, and
an underdog, an individual who is expected to lose. There are many well-established
advantages associated with being a favorite. Compared to underdogs, favorites enjoy
greater self-efficacy, higher motivation, enhanced performance (McNatt & Judge, 2004)
and even better physical endurance (Weinberg et al., 1980). Further, the high
expectations that accompany being a favorite improve attitudes, promote positive
leadership behaviors (Eden and Shani, 1982), and speed re-employment following a job
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loss (Eden & Aviram, 1993). The benefits of being a favorite have been documented
across diverse domains (Eden, 2003) ranging from corporations to the military (Eden &
Zuk, 1995), academia (Chapman and McCauley, 1993), and experimental laboratories
(Gold, 1999). In sum, past research has identified a host of advantages to being a favorite.
In this paper, we examine decisions favorites and underdogs make about whether
to persist or quit in a competition. If competitors focused exclusively on winning, we
would expect favorites to be more likely to persist than underdogs. After all, favorites are
more likely to succeed than underdogs and persisting should be easier for favorites
because they are more skilled and enjoy greater self-efficacy (McNatt and Judge, 2004).
However, we theorize that competitors pursue other objectives in addition to
winning. Specifically, we conjecture that impression management motives may lead
favorites to quit more often than underdogs. Particularly when facing a likely loss,
favorites may derive greater impression management benefits from quitting than
underdogs. Instead of violating expectations (and losing), favorites who quit promote a
self-serving counterfactual: they could have won. Thus under some conditions, the
impression management benefits of quitting may outweigh the benefits of persisting for
favorites.
Consider, for example, the paradigmatic incumbent politician who is behind in the
polls and quits a race citing the need to spend more time with family. By quitting, the
politician accomplishes two impression management objectives. First, she communicates
that family demands may have been greater than observers appreciated, providing an
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excuse for her poor performance. Second, the politician avoids the salient, negative, and
expectation-violating experience of losing.
Thus, we propose that due to impression management concerns, being labeled a
favorite has an unexpected drawback: it can reduce persistence. We further predict that
holding all else equal, assignment to favorite status (rather than underdog status) will be
particularly likely to cause individuals to quit in competitions when early performance
suggests that victory is unlikely.
To investigate these predictions, we identified a setting in which we could
observe competitions with several key features. Specifically, we sought a setting where
we could observe high stakes competitions and could objectively (a) classify competitors
along a continuum from extreme favorites to extreme underdogs, (b) assess each
competitor’s prospects of prevailing mid-way through a competition, and (c) observe
quitting behavior. We chose to analyze data from a rich, archival data set of 328,425
professional men’s tennis matches.
Our investigation contributes to a growing literature that has drawn important
managerial insights from archival records of athletic competitions (e.g., see Reifman,
Larrick and Fein, 1991; Kilduff et al. 2010; Larrick et al., 2011; Pope and Schweitzer,
2011). In our analyses, we find that holding all else equal, classification as a favorite
(rather than an underdog) causes competitors to quit more often, particularly when
competitors are facing a probable defeat. The athletes in our dataset are strongly
incentivized experts. They have trained for years in the performance domain that we
study, and their decision to quit is costly—it eliminates their opportunity to earn large
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rewards. Importantly, quitting in this setting has no immediate economic advantages over
losing; for professional tennis players, quitting and losing have identical implications for
world rankings and pay (according to the official rulebook of the Association of Tennis
Professionals). That is, compared to experiencing a loss, quitting in this setting yields
identical ranking and tournament outcomes, but has potentially different impression
management consequences.
With this study, we identify an important disadvantage to being a favorite. We
contribute to an emerging literature that has qualified prior findings that have identified
substantial benefits to being a favorite. For instance, recent studies have revealed that
favorites may suffer from overconfidence (McGraw et al., 2004) and may be less well
liked than underdogs (Goldschmied & Vandello, 2009; McGinnis & Gentry, 2009;
Paharia, Keinan, Avery and Schor, 2011). Our investigation identifies a very different
drawback to being a favorite and postulates a very different mechanism through which
being a favorite can adversely affect performance and persistence. Specifically, we
highlight a novel drawback to being a favorite: the impression management concerns
created by high performance expectations reduce persistence. In sum, integrating prior
research, we demonstrate that there are not only benefits but also costs to being a
favorite.
Impression Management
We theorize that impression management concerns cause favorites to exit
competitions prematurely. Specifically, we argue that favorites face higher expectations
than underdogs, and that quitting represents a strategy for managing impressions.
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In social contexts, people are concerned with the impressions they create.
Impression management is “the process by which individuals attempt to control the
impressions that others form of them” (Leary and Kowalski, 1990, p. 34). A number of
industries illustrate the widespread demand for creating positive impressions, from the
multi-billion dollar market for cosmetics to the market for image consultants and public
relations departments. Sometimes managing impressions even involves deception:
popular websites like cantyouseeimbusy.com offer games that employees can play while
maintaining the appearance that they are working. Though we recognize that impression
management concerns can have both intrapersonal and interpersonal implications (Apsler
1975; Modigliani 1971; Stevens and Kristof, 1995), with respect to quitting behavior, we
consider holistic impression management concerns.
Impression management concerns guide many decisions within organizations. For
example, past research has demonstrated that impression management motives affect how
organizational actors express their opinions, engage in prosocial behavior, and make
apologies (Gardner and Martinko, 1988; Grant and Mayer, 2009; Jain, 2012; Chiaburu,
2014). Further, behaviors inspired by impression management motives have also been
demonstrated to influence important outcomes such as perceptions of employees’
performance (Wayne & Liden, 1995) and of interviewees (Baron, 1986).
Self-Handicapping as an Impression Management Strategy
Self-handicapping is an impression management strategy in which individuals
take action to limit their own performance and create an external attribution for poor
performance (Berglas & Jones, 1978; Greenberg et al. 1984; Kolditz & Arkin, 1982). In

6

this paper, we focus on a specific type of self-handicapping: quitting. We postulate that
favorites quit to manage impressions. By self-handicapping, individuals take a preemptive action that makes the link between poor performance and their true abilities
more ambiguous (Jones and Berglas, 1978). For example, a student who anticipates
performing poorly on a test may stay out late drinking the night before the test and then
blame his failure on a hangover rather than incompetence. Self-handicapping is an
attractive strategy for individuals who expect to fall short of expectations because it
provides an external attribution (e.g. alcohol poisoning) for poor performance and thus
weakens the link between poor performance and personal failings.
Past research suggests that self-handicapping is prevalent. Scholars have
documented self-handicapping in domains ranging from athletics (e.g. Ntoumanis et al.,
2010) to academics (e.g. Gadbois & Sturgeon, 2011). Self-handicapping is an impression
management strategy that is particularly relevant to quitting in competitions because it
can provide an excuse both for poor performance and for exiting a competition
prematurely. For example, an employee competing to be the top salesperson in a given
month can claim she is having family problems to create both an external reason for
failing to win the competition and an excuse for exiting the competition before it has
concluded. This same self-handicapping phenomenon is reflected in athletic
competitions. Athletes who quit by falsely claiming to be injured create an external
attribution for their poor performance (the injury), and generate an excuse for exiting the
competition before it has concluded. However, not all competitors face the high levels of
expectation that make self-handicapping attractive.
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Role Expectations and Impression Management
Favorites and underdogs, by construction, face different performance
expectations. These different performance expectations influence differences in both
impression management concerns and impression management strategies. Past research
has shown that people strive to meet the positive expectations associated with their social
or professional roles (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Impression management in rolegoverned situations is often based on a prototype-matching process: individuals seek to
conform as closely as possible to the prototypical characteristics of whatever role they are
playing (e.g., leader, minister, police officer, professor, etc.; Leary, 1989). For example,
Jones et al. (1963) found that Reserve Officers’ Training Corps cadets with different
levels of status managed the impressions they made on others differently according to
their respective roles. In related work, Leary et al. (1986) found that leaders who believed
that a particular type of leadership style was most effective for a particular situation
attempted to foster impressions of themselves that matched the prescribed leadership
style. In line with this, Marr and Thau (2013) found that high-status individuals are more
threatened by losses. Together, this research shows that people use impression
management strategies to conform to the expectations of their role. Within competitions,
we would expect favorites and underdogs to use impression management strategies to
conform to the expectations of their respective roles.
Expectations in Competitions
Favorites and underdogs face different expectations in competitions. In our
setting, rankings determine whether or not competitors are favorites or underdogs, and
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competitors’ relative ranks influence performance expectations. Expectations influence
competitive behavior, and past scholarship has substantially developed our understanding
of how people develop performance expectations (e.g. Bandura, 1997; Buckley et al.,
1998). One common organizational tool that communicates performance expectations is a
ranking system.
Ranking systems pervade organizations. Firms such as G.E. and Accenture use
rankings to rate, reward, and promote employees (Olson, 2013). Similarly, sales and
productivity rankings are common in organizations (Barankay, 2014), and organizations
and products are often ranked based on their quality and performance (Luca & Smith,
2013). Rankings are also widely used in other settings: students in schools are often
ranked (Johnson, 2006) and professional athletes and teams are routinely ranked (Berry,
2003). A reliable ranking system succinctly summarizes available information about
relative skill. Further, rankings can directly inform dichotomous performance
expectations. That is, when making predictions about outcomes, we expect higher ranked
individuals and teams to outperform or defeat lower ranked individuals and teams.
Past research has shown that rankings inform our expectations about the quality of
competitors and thus influence our decisions. For example, rankings influence hospital
choice (Pope, 2009), restaurant selection (Luca, 2014), webpage visits (Ghose et al.,
2013), and which universities students attend (Dill and Soo, 2005; Luca and Smith, 2011;
Carter, 1998). In the domain of sports, bettors routinely pick “favorites” to win in
competitive matchups (Levitt, 2004), even after the bet is altered so that underdogs are
more likely to prevail (Simmons & Nelson, 2006). A competitor’s ranking can influence
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not only others’ expectations, but also the competitor’s own behavior. For example,
managers whose organizations are given a ranking that deviates from their beliefs are
more likely to initiate organizational change (Martins, 2005; Espeland & Sauder, 2007).
Taken together, prior research demonstrates that people pay attention to rankings and
form expectations about relative quality and competitive outcomes based upon rankings.
Expectations about success, often informed by ranking information, influence the
effort that competitors exert and how they react to defeat. For example, Nelson and Furst
(1972) found that competitors were more likely to win an arm strength contest when they
were told that they were favored to win. This research highlights that whether or not
individuals expect to win substantively changes their behavior in competitions. In related
work, Weinberg et al. (1980) demonstrated this by measuring performance in a leg lifting
task. Weinberg et al., (1980) asked participants to sit in a chair and hold their legs above
the ground for as long as they were able. Participants were timed and their times were
compared to those of their assigned opponents. Weinberg et al. (1980) found that how
participants performed—and how they reacted to defeat—was affected by whether or not
they expected to win. When participants were told that they had competed with and lost
to an athlete, they were less upset than when they were told that they had competed with
and lost to a recovering surgery patient.
Although better rankings can benefit competitors in many ways (e.g., by
enhancing self-efficacy, motivation, and performance; McNatt and Judge, 2004), we
argue that past research has largely overlooked the important possibility that better
rankings can also disadvantage competitors. Specifically, better rankings create
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impression management challenges. We theorize that better-ranked competitors
(favorites) will feel greater pressure than underdogs to avoid defeat because avoiding
defeat is required for favorites to meet performance expectations. Particularly when
favorites begin to lose, we postulate that they may prefer to self-handicap (e.g., by
claiming a false injury and quitting), rather than persist.
Quitting
Public officials, athletes, managers, employees and private citizens frequently
face decisions about whether to quit or persist. Often, people quit prematurely when
perseverance would be wise (Glebbeek & Bax, 2004; Bowen, 1982; Ewusi-Mensah &
Przasnyski, 1991; Shalvi et al., 2013; Weber & Camerer, 1998). Prior work has found
that people are more likely to quit competitions when they feel that their chance of
winning is small (Muller & Schotter, 2010), when winning requires high effort
(Fershtman & Gneezy, 2011), and when they experience anxiety (Brooks & Schweitzer,
2011). We show that, in addition to these other drivers of quitting, impression
management concerns can lead people to quit prematurely.
Within a competition, the ideal way to manage impressions is to win. Winners
project talent and competence. However, when winning is improbable, quitting may offer
another acceptable impression management strategy via self-handicapping: conveying an
excuse for poor performance. In elections, politicians often quit claiming the pressing
need to spend time with family. In physical competitions, competitors often quit after
claiming an injury. Like politicians who claim family troubles and indeed have ill family
members, many competitors who claim injuries are actually injured. However,
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competitors also sometimes quit and falsely claim that they are injured. We confirmed
this by surveying a sample of professional men’s tennis players (N=11; median age = 26;
median years on the pro tour = 8). They unanimously agreed that some professional
tennis players quit for reasons other than sickness and injury.1 By quitting, we theorize
that competitors who face a loss can manage impressions by avoiding an explicit loss,
and by instead offering an external attribution for their subpar performance.
Qualitative evidence suggests that athletes do use reports of illness and injury as a
self-handicapping strategy. Rhodewalt, Saltzman, and Wittmer (1984) found in a survey
study that competitive athletes with a high tendency to self-handicap were also more
likely to report illness and injury. Previous work, however, has not explored the
relationship between expectations and self-handicapping decisions. We show in a large,
archival field study that performance expectations influence quitting: holding all else
equal, competitors assigned the status of a favorite (as opposed to an underdog) are more
likely to quit. This finding is moderated by initial success; competitors who are endowed
with favorite status and who face a probable loss are more likely to quit than underdogs.
Hypotheses
By providing an ordered list of competitors’ quality, ranking systems create
favorites and underdogs in competitions. Favorites face different performance
expectations than underdogs: favorites are expected to win, whereas underdogs are
expected to lose. With respect to these expectations, underdogs have the potential to
either meet expectations or exceed them. In contrast, favorites have the potential to either

1

All reported having heard of this happening, and all but one reported having seen it happen.
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meet expectations or fall short of them. These dynamics crate different impression
management concerns for favorites and underdogs. Quitting is an impression
management strategy that allows favorites to mitigate the harmful impression
management consequences of a potential defeat. Specifically, quitting is a form of selfhandicapping, as it gives competitors an alternative, external attribution for poor
performance besides low skill (e.g., injury). We predict that due to the higher impression
management risks they face in competition, otherwise identical competitors who are
arbitrarily classified as slight favorites will employ the impression management strategy
of quitting at a higher rate than competitors arbitrarily classified as slight underdogs. In
other words, we predict that otherwise identical competitors will persist more or less
depending on their mere classification as a favorite or underdog.
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, a competitor is more likely to quit a
competition when he (or she) is classified as a favorite rather than an underdog.
We will test this hypothesis using a regression discontinuity design (see the Methods
Section for more detail) that allows us to infer a causal relationship between assignment
of favorite (versus underdog) status and subsequent persistence and entirely rules out
differential selection as an alternative explanation.
We expect losing to be more aversive for favorites than underdogs. When
favorites begin to lose a competition, our theory predicts that compared to underdogs,
favorites will care about and derive greater benefit from managing impressions. Losing is
always unpleasant, but falling short of expectations is particularly aversive. Therefore, we
predict that the increased likelihood of quitting caused by being a favorite (rather than an
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underdog) will be moderated by a competitor’s likelihood of defeat. Specifically, we
predict that favorites will seek impression management strategies more actively than
underdogs when they face a probable loss.
Hypothesis 2: The increased likelihood of quitting caused by favorite status will
be moderated by the likelihood of losing. Specifically, the positive relationship
between favorite status and quitting will be larger when the likelihood of a loss is
greater.

METHODS
To test our two hypotheses, we sought a competitive setting in which individual
competitors were ranked and quitting was observable. We chose a domain with decades
of rich data uniquely well-suited to test our predictions: professional men’s tennis.
Many management scholars have successfully used sports data to study
organizational phenomena, such as rivalry (Kilduff et al. 2010), developmental networks
(Cotton et al. 2011), tacit knowledge (Berman et al. 2002), risk management (Romer
2002), loss aversion (Pope and Schweitzer 2011), and workplace aggression (Reifman et
al., 1991; Larrick et al., 2011). Studies of professional sports offer a number of distinct
benefits for management research. For instance, within sports, outcomes are observable
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and abundant. Most importantly for our investigation, sports contexts instantiate the
organizational issues of competition, persistence, and quitting. We build on a rich
tradition of extant management scholarship exploring sports data to test our thesis.
Dataset
We compiled our dataset from the online data archive maintained by the
American Tennis Professionals’ (ATP) World Tour (www.atpworldtour.com). This
archive includes detailed historical information about men’s professional tennis
tournament draws, match scores, and players’ world rankings. The dataset includes
information from 329,063 men’s professional singles tennis matches played between
1973 and 2011.
Our dataset is rich, but limited. Our data includes information about each player’s
age as well as information about each match, including the name of the tournament, the
tournament round in which it was played, the prize money at stake in the tournament, and
the final match score. Within our dataset, we know the number of games won and lost by
each player in each set, but we do not know the scores of individual games or the order in
which games were won or lost during a set. Players’ relative rank is our primary predictor
variable, so we discarded matches for which one or both players’ rankings were not
recorded (N=638). We excluded these matches, as well as matches with missing scores
(N=506). This left us with 328,425 matches that we included in our analyses. Some of
these observations (N=15,955) were missing age data, and others (N=38,321) were
missing prize money data. For these observations, we replaced the missing values with
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the mean value from the rest of the dataset and we included an indicator variable to
represent the type of information that was missing.
In Tables 1 and 2, we report summary statistics from the matches we analyze. Our
data includes information about the surface that each match was played on, including
grass (N=16,578), clay (N=153,863), hard courts (N=130,718), and carpet (N=27,131),
with 602 matches missing surface data. It also includes the tour, or tournament category,
associated with each match, including the Grand Slam Tour (N=17,267), the World Tour
(N=85,741), the Masters Tour (N=11,100), the Challenger Tour (N=91,647), and the
Futures Tour (N=122,969), with 168 matches missing tour classifications. We classified
observations that were missing categorical data into new “missing” categories specific to
the variable for which they were missing data (e.g., “missing tour data”, etc.).
Critically, our data includes information about whether either competitor quit
mid-match. In addition, it includes information about who won the first set in each match,
which is a strong predictor of the probability of winning the match (first set winners are
match victors 82% of the time). We thus use defeat in the first set as a proxy for a
“probable loss” and explore this moderator to test our second hypothesis.

Analysis Strategy
We analyze the data described above to test our first hypotheses that holding all
else equal (player quality/skill, age, etc.), assigning a player status as a favorite (versus as
an underdog) increases his likelihood of quitting and our second hypothesis that this
effect is strengthened when players face a probable loss. To distinguish favorites from
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underdogs, we use a measure of player’s relative rank. Specifically, for each player for
each match we calculate a rank ratio, which is equal to a target player’s opponent’s
ranking divided by the target player’s own ranking. A rank ratio of 1 indicates that the
two players have equal ATP rankings. A rank ratio less than 1 indicates that the target
player has a worse (i.e. higher) ATP ranking than his opponent, and is therefore the
underdog. A rank ratio that is greater than 1 indicates that the target player has a better
(i.e. lower) ATP ranking than his opponent, and is therefore favored to win. For example,
a player ranked 100 facing an opponent ranked 101 will have rank ratio of 1.01, and his
opponent will have rank ratio about 0.99. A rank ratio is specific to a player and a match,
so two players meeting in a match will have different (reciprocal) rank ratios, and players
will have many different rank ratios across the many matches they play throughout their
careers. The logarithm of this measure, the log(rank ratio), has a smooth, linear
relationship with a player’s likelihood of winning a match (see Figure 2). This logged
rank ratio measure is a much better measure of the relative quality of favorites and
underdogs (and thus their likelihood of winning a match) than other natural measures,
such as the difference between two players’ rankings, which does not yield a smooth,
linear predictor of who will win in a competition. Throughout our analyses we rely on
competitors’ logged rank ratio to capture their relative performance expectations and
ability, but the results we present are all robust to using differences in ranks instead of
rank ratio (though this alternative metric is inferior given that it is not a linear predictor of
match victory).
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We use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of being a
favorite rather than an underdog on a player’s likelihood of quitting (testing H1).
Regression discontinuity designs can be used to compare predictions about data that are
very close on either side of an otherwise arbitrary threshold (see Imbens and Lemieux,
2008). Regression discontinuity designs have been used fruitfully in economics and
psychology to study (among other things) the psychological effect of earning less money
than one’s spouse (Pierce et al., 2014), the effect of being assigned to a high-security
prison on recidivism (Chen and Shapiro, 2007), fraud in vehicle emissions tests (Pierce
and Snyder, 2012), and the effect of being behind in a basketball game at halftime
(Berger and Pope, 2012). Like experimental interventions, regression discontinuity
designs rely on randomness to make causal inference possible and overcome the potential
confound of non-random selection into a category (e.g., favorite status is of course not, in
general, randomly assigned since favorites are indeed better than underdogs, on average).
However, random chance leads individuals who are ranked along a continuum to fall just
above or just below a given, arbitrary threshold separating two categories (in this case,
these categories are match favorites and underdogs). Regression discontinuity designs
examine these arbitrary thresholds to explore whether or not a stark discontinuity in
outcomes (that otherwise change along a smooth continuum) emerges on either side of
said thresholds. Because of their reliance on randomness, regression discontinuity tests
allow researchers to draw causal inferences about interventions and rule out self-selection
as an alternative explanation for treatment effects (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).
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In our regression discontinuity analysis, we analyze the threshold at which players
are tied in rank (i.e., rank ratio=1). By investigating observations that are close to rank
ratio=1, we ensure that we are comparing similar situations – matches in which players
and their opponents have nearly identical rankings (e.g. a player ranked 100 is favored to
defeat a player ranked 101, but the difference in the two players’ ability is essentially
nonexistent). We can conclude that, compared to being the underdog, being favored in a
match has a causal influence on the likelihood of quitting if we find a large difference
between quitting rates on the two sides of the underdog-favorite threshold. Our dataset
includes some matches in which both players have the same recorded rank (N=73). In
these cases, we are unable to label either player the favorite or the underdog. Our results
are meaningfully unchanged when we run analyses with or without these matches.
To test the influence of being favored to win a match on quitting decisions, we
include an indicator variable, favorite, as a predictor of quitting that equals 1 if a player is
favored to beat their opponent (their log rank ratio is greater than 1) and 0 otherwise. In
or to fully control for the continuous relationship between the extent to which a player is
a favorite and his likelihood of quitting (or winning), in each regression we present, we
include a fourth-degree polynomial of the log-transformed rank ratio. To choose the order
of this polynomial, we followed Chen and Shapiro’s (2007) method: we iteratively added
higher-order terms to our regressions up to the point at which the next-highest term was
no longer statistically significant in predicting winning or quitting (the two outcome
variables we analyze) in any model. If the indicator variable favorite is a significant
predictor of quitting, even after we account for a fourth-degree polynomial of log rank
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ratio, we can conclude that being favored discontinuously affects a player’s likelihood of
quitting (confirming H1).
To test our second hypothesis, that the discontinuity in quitting rates between
favorites and underdogs will be magnified when players face a probable loss, we need an
objective measure of when a player faces a probable loss to interact with our favorite
indicator. In tennis, players who win the first set of a match have a very high probability
of winning the entire match, on average. Across all matches in our data set, first set
winners are match victors 82% of the time (see Table 2).2 If a player lost the first set, we
say that player is losing and examine this event as a dichotomous moderator of favorite
status. In such analyses, we carefully control for the exact score in the first set (by
including fixed effects for first set score: 0-6, 1-6, 2-6, etc.).3
We include a number of important control variables in all of our analysis. First,
we control for each player’s overall quality by including the focal player’s rank and their
opponent’s rank. Second, we control for each tournament’s tour (Grand Slam, Masters,
etc.) and total available prize money, because different types of tournaments may induce
different levels of player motivation. Similarly, we include controls for the round (1st, 2nd,
3rd, etc.) in which a match is played, because each subsequent round in a tournament has
more spectators and media coverage than the last. Different tours are characterized by
different tournament sizes, so the same round number corresponds to a different number
of remaining competitors across tours. To account for this, we include complete controls

2

In matches that require a player to win two sets to defeat his opponent, 83% of first set winners are match
victors. In matches that require a player to win three sets to defeat his opponent, first set winners are match
victors about 77% of the time.
3
Note that we do not know the order in which games are won or lost during a match, only final set scores.
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for the interactions between tour and round. We also control for court surface, which can
affect injury (Girard et al. 2007) and quitting rates (Breznik and Batagelj 2012). And, we
control for a player’s age, as age may relate to injury-proneness. In order to account for a
possible nonlinear relationship between age and injury-proneness, we also include a
second-order polynomial of player’s age. The results of our analyses are not
meaningfully changed when using a lower or higher degree polynomial of age. In order
to account for possible differences in behavior at different rank levels, we also include
interactions between both a player’s rank and his opponent’s rank with each term of the
fourth-order polynomial of log rank ratio. Finally, as mentioned above, we include
controls for the score of the first set (e.g., 6-0, 3-6, etc.), so that our analyses will
compare players who had identical outcomes at the beginning of a match.
We use an ordinary least squares model to predict quitting4, though our results are
meaningfully unchanged when we instead rely on logistic regression models (and we
report results from logit models in Appendix A as a robustness check). Formally, our
model can be stated as follows:
(1)

quitsi =

α + β1*favoritei + β2*log(rank_ratioi) + β3*log(rank_ratioi)2 +
β4*log(rank_ratioi)3 + β5*log(rank_ratioi)4 + β6*ranki +
β7*log(rank_ratioi) *ranki + β8*log(rank_ratioi)2*ranki +
β9*log(rank_ratioi)3*ranki + β10*log(rank_ratioi)4*ranki +

4

We report the result from ordinary least squares regression models in our primary analyses rather than
logistic regressions for several reasons. Not only are results from OLS regressions easier to interpret, but
we include a large number of fixed effects in our models, and logistic regression models typically produce
inconsistent estimates when fixed effects are included unless data characteristics meet a stringent set of
assumptions (for details about the “incidental parameter problem”, see Wooldridge, 2010). Further, we
include interaction terms in our models, and interaction terms in nonlinear models can be subject to bias, as
highlighted in Ai and Norton (2003). However, as shown in Appendix A, our results are nearly identical
when we instead rely on logistic regressions.
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β11*opponent_ranki + β12*log(rank_ratioi) *opponent_ranki +
β13*log(rank_ratioi)2* opponent_ranki +
β14*log(rank_ratioi)3*opponent_ranki +
β15*log(rank_ratioi)4*opponent_ranki + β16*agei + β17*agei2 +
β18*prize_moneyi +θ*Xi
where 𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖 is a variable that takes a value of 1 when target player i quits, and 0
otherwise. Our primary predictor variables quantify the extent to which being favored to
defeat an opponent, target player rank, opponent’s rank, rank ratio, age, and prize money
predict quitting. The term 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of our other control variables including:
tournament round, tour, round-tour interaction, court surface, year, and first set score.5
We use a resampling methodology to obtain coefficient estimates and standard
errors in this model. Specifically, we divided our data into two subsets of equal size, each
including one randomly chosen observation (representing a player in a specific match)
from each match. We ran regressions on both subsets and stored the resulting
coefficients. We repeated this procedure multiple times for each reported regression,
obtaining enough coefficient estimates to make inferences about each. In Tables 3-8, we
report the means and standard deviations of these coefficient estimates. Our results are
meaningfully unchanged whether employing this strategy or performing analyses without
resampling. However, we employ this strategy because it is strictly the correct way to
obtain coefficient estimates in light of the fact that there are two observations per match
in our data (one for each player). By construction, one player’s choice to quit precludes

5

Although we have a large panel dataset, the median number of times a player in our dataset quits is 0.
Thus, including player fixed effects in our model to predict quitting is not appropriate because the data
lacks sufficient depth.
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his opponent from quitting. As a result, a match that ends in one player quitting
corresponds to an observed quitting decision and an observed persistence decision.
Including both (non-independent) observations would bias the estimated effects of match
characteristics on quitting decisions downward. Performing analyses on one observation
per match solves this problem, but it eliminates half of the observations from our dataset.
Our resampling strategy enables us to avoid double counting match-level data in any
analyses, and also to take into account player-specific data from all observations in our
data set. Our strategy is similar to bootstrapping, a nonparametric method for assessing
the errors in a statistical estimation problem (Efron, 1982), and other similar resampling
strategies have been used in numerous past studies (e.g. Bone, Sharma, and Shimp, 1989;
Inman and McAlister, 1993; Van Trijp et al., 1996).
To test our second hypothesis, we relied on a regression specification similar to
equation (1), but we included several additional predictors. The primary predictor of
interest in our test of our second hypothesis was an interaction between favorite and an
indicator for whether the target player lost the first set of a given match (lost_first_set).
The coefficient estimated on this interaction term measures the extent to which the
favorite/underdog discontinuity is greater for athletes who lost the first set. The
specification used to test our second hypothesis also included interactions between the
indicator for whether a player lost the first set and each term of the fourth-degree
polynomial of log rank ratio (four terms total). The inclusion of these interaction terms in
our specification ensures that the (favorite)x(lost_first_set) interaction (the predictor of
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interest) is not picking up a spurious effect (a continuous effect of log rank ratio rather
than a discontinuous difference between favorites and underdogs).
RESULTS
Professional tennis players quit in the middle of approximately 1.4% of the
matches in our data set (N=328,425). Not surprisingly, older players, players who lost the
first set by a larger margin, players in less prestigious tournaments, and players in early
rounds of tournaments are more likely to quit.
Consistent with our first hypothesis, we find that favorites are more likely to quit
than underdogs. In Figure 2, we show quitting rates and winning rates for players close to
the threshold separating match favorites from underdogs (rank ratio=1). As the top left
panel of Figure 2 illustrates, among players who lose the first set of a match, there is a
significant discontinuity in a player’s likelihood of quitting at the threshold separating
favorites from underdogs. Slight underdogs, or players whose rank is 85%-100% of their
opponents’ rank (N=23,769) retire in 1.62% of cases, but slight favorites, or players
whose rank is 100%-115% of their opponents’ rank (N=19,213) retire at a significantly
higher rate, 2.06% of cases, χ2 = 10.87, p < .001). The 26.5% jump in the likelihood of
quitting at this underdog-favorite threshold is notably larger than the increase observed at
other rank-ratio thresholds (see Figure 2). We next report a series of regression analyses
that analyze the significance of this discontinuity after including relevant control
variables.
Our regression results reveal a significant discontinuity at the threshold between
being the underdog in a match (rank ratio < 1) and being favored to win (rank ratio > 1).
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This tells us that being assigned “favorite” status (rather than “underdog” status) causes
otherwise identical players to quit at a higher rate. In Table 3, we report results from
Model 1, which predicts quitting and includes our full set of controls, including age, age
squared, prize money, surface, tour, round, tour-round interaction, year, and first set
score. As Model 1 of Table 3 reveals, the coefficient estimate for favorite is statistically
significant for all matches (βfavorite=.0016, p<.01). This indicates that players have
markedly different patterns of quitting behavior on either side of the threshold of equal
rank, even when players are very close to the threshold and are ranked very similarly.
Specifically, players are 10.7% more likely to quit when they are slight favorites than
when they are slight underdogs. These results support Hypothesis 1: having a higher rank
than one’s opponent increases the likelihood that a player will quit.
We next turn to a test of our second hypothesis: that the underdog-favorite
quitting discontinuity is moderated by likelihood of defeat. In Table 3, Model 2, we
present a regression model including all matches but with an added interaction between
losing the first set and being the match favorite. We include interactions between losing
the first set and each of the fourth degree polynomial controls for log(rank ratio) as well
to ensure that our interaction solely identifies the discontinuity at the underdog-favorite
threshold. We find that the interaction between losing the first set and being the match
favorite is significant and positive (βfavorite_x_lostfirstset=0.0053, p<0.001), indicating that the
discontinuous jump in quitting rates at the underdog-favorite threshold in Table 3, Model
1 is stronger for favorites who lose the first set, and thus confirming Hypothesis 2.
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We can focus our analyses of quitting on those players who lost the first set in a
match and face a probably loss. Here, we find a significant discontinuity in quitting rates
at the threshold between being the underdog in a match (rank ratio < 1) and being a
favorite (rank ratio > 1; see Table 3, Model 3). In fact, slight favorites who lose the first
set are 25.3% more likely to quit than players who are slight underdogs. Conversely,
favorites who won the first set are no more likely to quit than underdogs (see Table 3,
Model 4).
Alternative Explanations for Our Findings
The impact of being the favorite (rather than the underdog) in a competition on
quitting decisions is large and statistically significant. We find that being favored to
defeat one’s opponent is causally related to quitting and moderated by falling behind in a
competition. We theorize that these effects are driven by impression management
concerns. In the following analyses, we consider and rule-out alternative explanations for
our findings.
Ruling out a Discontinuity in Skill Levels as an Explanation for Quitting Behavior
First, we consider and rule-out the possibility that being a (slight) match favorite
leads to a discontinuous increase in the odds of winning a match rather than a smooth
increase in the odds of victory. If players who are slightly better than their opponents are
discontinuously more likely to win, then the discontinuous increase in quitting rates that
we observe at the favorite-underdog threshold could simply reflect an artifact of a
discontinuous increase in relative skill levels. To rule this out, we examine whether
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favorites and underdogs have discontinuously different skill levels. The likelihood of
winning is our proxy for relative skill.
Panels II.A and II.B in Figure 2 visually depict the relationship between rank
ratio and likelihood of winning. In general, a higher rank ratio corresponds to a greater
likelihood of winning. There is no apparent discontinuity at the threshold of tied rank.
The apparently smooth relationship between rank ratio and skill suggests that there is not
a discontinuous difference in skill level at the threshold of tied rank. However, we test for
this potential discontinuity with statistical models to be sure. In four models presented as
Models 1-4 in Table 4, we rely on identical regression specifications to those presented in
Models 1-4 of Table 3 that differ only in that they predict whether players will win the
match instead of predicting quitting. A significant, discontinuous increase in a player’s
likelihood of winning at the favorite/underdog threshold would provide evidence of
significant and discontinuous skill differences between slight favorites and slight
underdogs, but we find no such increase. In these regressions, favorite is not a significant
predictor of the likelihood of winning for all players combined (Table 4, Model 1), in our
interaction model (Table 4, Model 2), for players who lost the first set (Table 4, Model
3), or for players who won the first set (Table 4, Model 4).
In sum, a player’s likelihood of winning, and thus relative skill, appears to change
smoothly across the threshold of equal rank and elsewhere. Based on these results, we
conclude that the quitting discontinuity we observe is not driven by a discontinuous
increase in skill at the underdog-favorite threshold.
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Ruling out Discontinuities at Other Thresholds as an Explanation for Quitting
Behavior
We next consider whether or not quitting is so unpredictable and turbulent that
statistical tests spuriously reveal discontinuities in quitting rates not only at the favoriteunderdog threshold, but at many places along the rank ratio continuum. The importance
and interpretability of the discontinuity we detect in quitting rates at the favoriteunderdog threshold would be diminished if there were many such discontinuities in the
data. For example, if we found discontinuities in quitting at other, less meaningful
thresholds, our key findings might reflect an artifact of irregularities in the data or of the
statistical tests we used rather than clear support for Hypothesis 1. To rule out this
possibility, we followed the suggestion of Imbens and Lemieux (2008): We split the
dataset in half at the underdog-favorite threshold and tested for discontinuities at the
median value of rank ratio of each of these halves. This is essentially a “placebo” test,
and we do not expect to find discontinuities. Table 5, Model 1 reports the results of a
placebo test with the half of our data including underdogs (rank ratio<0). Table 5, Model
2 reports the results of another placebo test with the half of our data including favorites
(rank ratio>0). The “higher than median” indicator is not significant in either model,
indicating that there are not discontinuities at the median of either half of the data. This
suggests that the discontinuity we observe at the underdog-favorite threshold is unique.
Because the largest and most highly significant discontinuity in Table 3 was observed
when considering first set losers (see Table 3, Model 3), we also restricted our analysis to
these players to obtain a conservative test as a secondary robustness check. Table 5,
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Model 3 reports the results of this additional placebo test with the half of our data
including underdogs (rank ratio<0). Table 5, Model 4 reports the results of this additional
placebo test using the half of our data including favorites (rank ratio>0). The “higher
than median” indicator remains non-significant in these models as well.

Ruling out Self-Selection as an Explanation for Quitting Behavior
It is also important to rule out self-selection across the threshold analyzed when
using regression discontinuity designs. However, players cannot choose their rank, their
opponents, or the structure of tournament draws, all of which are decided by ATP
officials. It is therefore not plausible that players self-select from one side of the
underdog-favorite threshold to the other. Self-selection in regression discontinuity
designs is sometimes tested by examining whether the density of observations has a
discontinuity at the threshold of interest (Berger and Pope 2011, Imbens and Lemieux
2008). Since our dataset is “symmetric” (for every slight underdog, there is a slight
favorite), the density of observations is perfectly symmetric at the underdog-favorite
threshold.
The only way self-selection could possibly occur is if, after being assigned an
opponent but before beginning a match, some players choose to be “no shows” and
withdraw (this is called a “walkover” in professional tennis). It is, in principle, possible
that a discontinuity in walkovers could explain the discontinuity we detect in mid-match
withdrawals (quitting). Walkovers are rare in our data, occurring in about 0.4% of
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matches. To test the (unlikely) possibility that a discontinuity in walkovers could be
driving our effects and thus entirely rule out the possibility of self-selection, we repeat
our primary regression analysis presented in Table 3 (Model 1), but with a player’s
choice to walkover as the binary dependent variable. We report the results from this
ordinary least squares regression in Table 6. Note that we only examine Model 1 with this
alternative dependent variable and not Models 2-4 because Models 2-4 require
information about a player’s performance in the first set of a match, and when a player
chooses to walkover, he forfeits a match before it begins, thus precluding a first set
outcome from arising. As predicted, favorite is not a significant predictor of walkovers in
Table 6, Model 1, indicating that there is no evidence that a discontinuity in walkovers at
the underdog-favorite threshold could be driving the effect. Thus, we can confidently rule
out selection effects as a possible explanation for our findings.
Injuries and the Favorite-Underdog Discontinuity in Quitting
Though there is no physical reason why injuries would be discontinuously more
likely to arise for favorites than underdogs, it is possible that favorites might interpret the
same injuries as discontinuously more painful and problematic than underdogs. To
address this possibility, we examine whether the underdog-favorite quitting discontinuity
is strengthened or weakened in later rounds of a competition. This helps us discriminate
between an account of our effect that is based on perceived injuries and an account based
on impression management concerns. Each round of a tennis tournament consists of
grueling physical competition. If the quitting decisions we observe were based on
perceptions of injuries, we would expect the discontinuity in quitting we detect to
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increase in later rounds of competition, as athletes become more injury-prone due to
greater fatigue and physical strain. In contrast, if the quitting decisions we observe were
based on impression management concerns, we could expect an attenuation of the
favorite-underdog quitting discontinuity in later rounds. After competitors advance
further in a tournament, their identities as winners become more secure. Thus, the need
for favorites to avoid losses to underdogs to manage impressions is reduced in later
rounds of a tournament.
We examine whether and how the round of a tournament moderates the favoriteunderdog quitting discontinuity. We rely on the same regression specification detailed in
Equation 1 and the same resampling methodology we use throughout this paper. In order
to test moderation by tournament round, we add an interaction between favorite and
round (mean-centered) to our baseline model (Table 3, Model 1) as a new predictor of
interest, and we add controls for round fully interacted with the log rank ratio polynomial
to predict quitting. The results of this analyses are presented in Table 3, Model 5. The
predictor of interest: favorite x round, is marginally significant (p<.07), negative, and
sizable compared to the main effect of favorite status on quitting (βfavorite_x_round= -0.0008,
while βfavorite = 0.0015). This result indicates that the quitting discontinuity is moderated
by round, and (since the estimated effect is negative) that the favorite/underdog quitting
disparity is attenuated in later rounds of competition. This finding is consistent with our
impression management account of the favorite/underdog quitting discontinuity and
inconsistent with an injury account.
Additional Robustness Tests
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To ensure the robustness of our results, we conducted several additional tests besides
those described previously. We determined that all of our findings are robust to the
following transformations of the data designed to ensure our results were not driven by
outliers:
(1) Winsorizing extreme rank ratios. In order to accommodate the possibility that our
results are driven by players with extremely high or low rank ratios, we
winsorized this variable (setting the right tail equal to the value of the 97.5th
percentile, and the left tail equal to the 2.5th percentile).
(2) Trimming extreme rank ratios. Similarly, we dropped all observations with rank
or rank ratio greater than the 97.5th percentile or less than the 2.5th percentile.
In addition, as we report in Appendix A, our results remain robust when we rely on
logistic regression models instead of OLS regression models.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
When the going gets tough, favorites are more likely to quit than underdogs. In
spite of the many benefits of being a favorite, including enhanced self-efficacy,
motivation, performance and physical endurance (McNatt and Judge, 2004; Weinberg et
al., 1980), we find that favorites face a significant obstacle to success. As favorites fall
behind in competitions, they become particularly likely to quit. For favorites, impression
management concerns may cause them to forgo opportunities to win substantial rewards.
In our investigation, we analyzed professional tennis players’ behavior and
identified a favorite-underdog discontinuity in quitting decisions. The regression
discontinuity design we employ enables us to make a causal inference about the effect of
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the “treatment” of being favored to defeat one’s opponent on quitting. The effects we
detect are relatively large (favorites are 10.7% more likely to quit than underdogs), highly
significant, and robust to a number of alternative specifications and robustness tests. The
main effect of favorite status on quitting is moderated by whether a player lost the first
set of the match – it is more than twice as large among players who face a probable loss.
Further, the pattern we observe is marginally weaker in later rounds of tournaments. This
finding is consistent with an impression management account because positive
impressions are more securely established later in a tournament, so quitting to save face
should be less necessary. However, this interaction is inconsistent with an account
whereby differential perceptions of an injury’s severity drive our findings since injuries
should be more severe in later rounds of a tournament.
Our regression discontinuity design estimates the differences between decisions
by athletes who are nearly identical except that some fall just barely above the underdogfavorite threshold, while others fall just barely below it. Our regression discontinuity
design does not compare average favorites with average underdogs. Rather, it compares
favorites and underdogs who are just above or below the underdog/favorite threshold.
This approach allows us to control for a player’s absolute and relative rank. Thus, aside
from being favored to win a match (or not) these players are otherwise indistinguishable.
That is, we can rule out the possibility that underlying differences between underdogs and
favorites (e.g., in endorsements, riches, ego, number of fans, skills, etc.) could account
for our finding, because underdogs and favorites who lie just above versus below the
threshold examined should be identical across these characteristics.
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In our setting, the consequences of defeat and quitting for players’ rankings and
earnings are identical, and we can also rule out selection effects for our findings (e.g., the
kinds of players who enter matches as slight favorites differ from those who enter
matches as slight underdogs). Matches and opponents are determined by independent
committees and players cannot directly influence the opponents they face. The only
possibly way for players to influence the opponents they face is by withdrawing from a
match before it begins. However, our analysis of pre-match withdrawals indicates that
underdogs and favorites do not withdraw prior to the start of a match at different rates.
Contributions
Our research makes several important contributions. First, we identify a
significant drawback to being a favorite in a competition. Favorites face higher
performance expectations than underdogs and greater impression management concerns
as a result. To gain greater insight into the quitting decisions tennis players make, we
interviewed 44 U.S. Division I varsity collegiate athletes (see Appendix B for details).
One interviewee expressed the drawback of being a favorite in a competition as follows:
“I was always more nervous when I was playing someone you were supposedly
supposed to beat. You were always very aware of it because everyone's always
like, ‘Oh I'm playing a seed,’6 or that sort of stuff. If you are a seed, you've been
in that situation, so you know what other people are thinking. Whenever someone
plays a seed it means they have nothing to lose and they're going to give it their
all, while you have everything to lose.”
In contrast to the extant literature that has overwhelmingly highlighted the advantages of
being a favorite, our findings reveal one potential downside of being a favorite.

6

A “seed” is a status bestowed upon the highest-ranked subset of players in tournament.
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Our research also provides insight into the impression management concerns that
favorites face and their consequences. Specifically, we shed light on how impression
management considerations can influence competitive behavior and can cause favorites
to be less likely to succeed. We identify quitting as an impression management tactic, and
we highlight the harmful effects (greater likelihood of quitting) that impression
management concerns can have for individuals and organizations. One varsity tennis
player we interviewed expressed the quitting decision as follows: “[Quitting] is kind of a
way out because you can say ‘oh I lost because.’ It’s not ‘I lost because the girl was
better than me,’ it’s ‘I lost because I’m hurt,’ or ‘I lost because I couldn’t play
anymore.’” Another player succinctly described why favorites quit more than underdogs:
“If [players are] losing to someone that they don’t think they should be
losing to, they’d rather make it seem like they’re injured and they can’t
keep playing or they’re sick and they can’t keep playing, almost as an
excuse as to why they were even down in the match, rather than just losing
completely and making it look like the other person is better than them.”
Throughout our lives – in competitions, organizations and relationships, we make
decisions about when to quit and when to persist. In spite of the great importance these
decisions can have, there are significant gaps in our understanding of the causes and
consequences of quitting. We identify impression management considerations as an
important antecedent of quitting, showing that competitors may quit in order to provide
an excuse for poor performance and avoid the negative impressions that come with defeat
at the hands of a supposedly lesser opponent.
Additionally, our findings identify a harmful consequence of ranking systems.
Ranking systems are common within and across organizations. Athletes pay a great deal
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of attention to rankings: one athlete we interviewed said that rankings are “something that
a lot of people think about… I definitely knew my ranking, just from my parents, or other
people, they would tell me… Even if I didn’t check, I would still know, it’s one of those
things that everybody knows.” According to coding of our 44 interviews by research
assistants, the overwhelming majority of athletes were either “always” (41%, n=18) or
“sometimes” (41%, n=18) aware of their opponent’s ranking and how it compared to
their own before the beginning of a match.7 Greater access to data and analytical tools
has facilitated increased reliance on ranking systems in many industries and organization
(Mills and Mills, 2014). In contrast to prior work that identified benefits to being highly
ranked (Bandiera et al., 2012), we identify a significant drawback to being highly ranked.
By creating positive performance expectations, ranking systems can cause favorites to
feel pressure to win in order to manage impressions. Our findings reveal that the interplay
between rankings and competitive performance may be far more complicated than prior
work has assumed (Bouton and Kirchsteiger, 2011). Not only should ranking systems be
used with caution, but competitive behaviors displayed within ranking systems should be
closely monitored.
Limitations and Future Directions
Our investigation, of course, has a number of important limitations. One such
limitation is a shortcoming of our archival data set. Though extremely rich, the data we
analyzed was limited in that it recorded information about players and their performance,

7

Three research assistants coded each interview for the frequency with which a player was aware of his/her
own ranking and his/her opponents’ ranking (coded as always, sometimes, never, or unknown, Fleiss’s
kappa=0.70). Only 14% (n=6) reported that they were “never” aware of this, and 5% (N=2) did not provide
enough information to be certain.
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but it did not record players’ emotions, thoughts, injuries, or illnesses. Though we were
able to demonstrate a causal link between being a favorite and a player’s likelihood of
quitting, we cannot be certain of the underlying mechanisms. Our explorations of
moderators and interviews with varsity athletes (see Appendix B) support our
hypothesized mechanism, but further research should investigate the relationship between
impression management concerns and quitting behavior. Our work highlights impression
management concerns as an understudied contributor to quitting decisions, but future
work should explore quitting behavior more generally and the role of impression
management concerns in motivating quitting behavior more specifically. For example,
future work should explore how people form subjective beliefs about the likelihood of
prevailing in a competition; how individual differences, such as vanity, moderate concern
for managing impressions; and how factors ranging from audience effects to
accountability and self-confidence influence the relationship between impression
management concerns and quitting.
In our investigation, we focused on quitting by individual decision makers. Future
work should extend our investigation to team and organizational quitting decisions.
Future work should also explore strategies to help favorites overcome impression
management concerns so that they will be more likely to persist. In some cases,
competitors may benefit from not knowing competition-relevant information, such as
their relative rank. Ultimately, we anticipate that this line of research will enable
managers to identify strategies to help individuals and organizations persist and compete
more effectively.

37

CHAPTER 1 REFERENCES
Ai, C., & Norton, E.C. 2003. Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economics
Letters, 80: 123-129.
Apsler, R. 1975. Effects of embarrassment on behavior toward others. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 32: 145-153.
Bandiera, O. Barankay, I., & Rasul, I. 2012. Team Incentives: Evidence from a Firm
Level Experiment, Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming.
Bandura, A. 1997. Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York: Freeman.
Barankay, I. 2014. Rank Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Workplace
Experiment. Working paper.
Baron, R. A. 1986. Self-Presentation in Job Interviews: When There Can Be “Too Much
of a Good Thing”. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 16(1):16-28.
Beersma, B., Hollenbeck, J. R., Humphrey, S. E., Moon, H., Conlon, D. E., & Ilgen, D.
R. 2003. Cooperation, competition, and team performance: Toward a contingency
approach. Academy of Management Journal, 46(5): 572-590.
Berger, J., & Pope, D. 2012. Can Losing Lead to Winning? Management Science, 57
(5): 817-827.
Berglas, S., & Jones, E. E. 1978. Control of attributions about the self through selfhandicapping strategies: The appeal of alcohol and the role of
underachievement. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4(2): 200-206.

38

Berman, S.L. Down, J., Hill, C. W.L. 2002. Tacit Knowledge as a Source of Competitive
Advantage in the National Basketball Association. Academy of Management
Journal, 45 (1): 13-31.
Berry, S.M. 2003. College Football Rankings: The BCS and the CLT. Chance, 16 (2):
46-49.
Bone, P. F., Sharma, S., & Shimp, T. A. 1989. A bootstrap procedure for evaluating
goodness-of-fit indices of structural equation and confirmatory factor
models. Journal of Marketing Research, 32: 105-111.
Bouton, L., & Kirchsteiger, G. 2011. Good rankings are bad – why reliable rankings can
hurt consumers. CEPR Discusssion Paper No. 8702.
Bowen, D.E. 1982. Some unintended consequences of intention to quit. Academy of
Management Review, 7 (2): 205-211.
Breznik, K., a& Batagelj, V. 2012. Retired matches among male professional tennis
players. Journal of Sports Science and Medicine, 11: 270-278.
Brooks, A.W., &Schweitzer, M.E. 2011. Can Nervous Nelly Negotiate? How anxiety
causes negotiators to make low first offers, exit early, and earn less profit.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115: 43-54.
Buckley, T. C., Blanchard, E. B., & Hickling, E. J. 1998. A confirmatory factor analysis
of posttraumatic stress symptoms. Behaviour Research and Therapy,36(11)
1091-1099.
Carter, Terry. 1998. "Rankled by the Rankings." ABA JOURNAL (1998): 46-52. Web.

39

Chan, T.Y., Li, J., and Pierce, L. 2014. Compensation and Peer Effects in Competing
Sales Teams. Management Science, 60(8):1965-1984.
Chapman, Gretchen B.; McCauley, Clark 1993.Early career achievements of National
Science Foundation (NSF) graduate applicants: Looking for Pygmalion and
Galatea effects on NSF winners. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78(5), 815-820.
Chen, M.K., J.M. Shapiro. 2007. Do Harsher Prison Conditions Reduce Recidivism? A
Discontinuity-based Approach. American Law and Economics Review, 9 (1): 129.
Chiaburu, D.S., Huang, J.L., and Hutchins, H.M. 2014. Trainees' perceived knowledge
gain unrelated to the training domain: the joint action of impression
management and motives. International Journal of Training and
Development, 18 (1): 37-52.
Cotton, R.D., Shen, Y., and Livne-Tarandach, R. 2011. On Becoming Extraordinary: The
Content and Structure of the Developmental Networks of Major League Baseball
Hall of Famers. Academy of Management Journal, 54 (1): 15-46.
Deutsch, M. 1949. A theory of cooperation and competition. Human Relations, 2: 129–
152.
Dill, D. D., and Soo, M. 2005. "Academic Quality, League Tables, and Public Policy: A
Cross
national Analysis of University Ranking Systems." Higher Education, 49 (4): 495- 533.

40

Eden, D. 2003. Self-fulfilling prophecies in organizations. In L.K. Stroh (Ed.),
Organizational Behavior: A Management Challenge. New York: Erlbaum Psych
Press.
Eden, D., and Aviram, A. 1993. Self-efficacy training to speed reemployment: Helping
people to help themselves. Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol 78(3), 352-360.
Eden, D., & Shani, A. B. 1982. Pygmalion goes to boot camp: Expectancy, leadership,
and trainee performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 67(2), 194.
Eden, D., & Zuk, Y. 1995. Seasickness as a self-fulfilling prophecy: raising self-efficacy
to boost performance at sea. Journal of Applied Psychology, 80(5), 628.
Efron, B. 1982. The Jackknife, the Bootstrap, and Other Resampling Plans. CBMS-NSF
Regional Conference Series in Applied Mathematics.
Espeland, W. N., & Sauder, M. "Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures
Recreate Social Worlds." American Journal of Sociology 113.1 (2007):
1-40.
Ewusi-Mensah, K., & Przasnyski, Z.H. 1991. On Information Systems Project
Abandonment: An Exploratory Study of Organizational Practices. MIS Quarterly,
15 (1): 67-86.
Fershtman, C., and Gneezy, U. 2011. The Tradeoff Between Performance and Quitting in
High Power Tournaments. Journal of the European Economic Association, 9
(2): 318-336.

41

Gadbois, S. A., & Sturgeon, R. D. 2011. Academic self‐handicapping: Relationships with
learning specific and general self‐perceptions and academic performance over
time. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 81(2): 207-222.
Gardner, W.L., and Martinko, M.J. 1988. Impression Management in Organizations.
Journal of Management, 14 (2): 321-338.
Ghose, A., Ipeirotis, P., and Li, B.. 2013. "Examining the Impact of Ranking on
Consumer Behavior and Search Engine Revenue." Management Science, 60(7): 16321654.
Girard, O., Eicher, F., Fourchet, F., Micallef, J.P., G.P. Millet. 2007. Effects of the
playing surface on plantar pressures and potential injuries in tennis. British
Journal of Sports Medicine, 41: 733-738.
Glebbeek, A.C., and Bax, E.H. 2004. Is High Employee Turnover Really Harmful? An
Empirical Test Using Company Records. Academy of Management Journal,
47(2): 277-286.
Gold, M.A. 1999. Pygmalion in cyberspace: Leaders’ high expectancies for subordinate
performance conveyed electronically versus face-to-face. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, The University at Albany, State University of New York.
Goldschmied, N., and Vandello, J.A. 2009. The Advantage of Disadvantage: Underdogs
in the Political Arena. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 31 (1).
Grant, A.M., and Mayer, D.M. 2009. Good soldiers and good actors: Prosocial and
impression management motives as interactive predictors of affiliative citizenship
behaviors. Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol 94(4), Jul 2009, 900-912.
42

Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., and Paisley, C. 1984. Effect of Extrinsic Incentives on
Use of Test Anxiety as an Anticipatory Attributional Defense: Playing it Cool
When the Stakes Are High. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47 (5),
1136-1145.
Imbens, G., T. Lemieux, T. 2008. Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice.
J. Econometrics 142 (2) 615–635.
Inman, J. J., & McAlister, L. 1993. A retailer promotion policy model considering
promotion signal sensitivity. Marketing Science, 12(4), 339-356.
Jain, A.K. 2012. Moderating effect of impression management on the relationship of
emotional intelligence and organizational citizenship behavior. Journal of
Behavioral and Applied Management, 13(2): 86-107.
Johnson Jr., A.M. 2006. The Destruction of the Holistic Approach to Admissions: The
Pernicious Effects of Rankings. Ind. L.J. 309.
Jones, E. E., Gergen, K. J., & Jones, R. G. 1963. Tactics of ingratiation among leaders
and subordinates in a status hierarchy. Psychological Monographs: General and
Applied, 77(3), 1.
Kilduff, G.J., Elfenbein, H.A., Staw, B.M. 2010. The Psychology of Rivalry: A
Relationally Dependent Analysis of Competition. Academy of Management
Journal, 53 (5), 943-969.
Kolditz, T.A., and Arkin, R.M. 1982. An impression management interpretation of the
self-handicapping strategy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol
43(3), Sep 1982, 492-502.

43

Larrick, R. P., Timmerman, T. A., Carton, A. M., & Abrevaya, J. 2011. Temper,
temperature, and temptation: Heat-related retaliation in baseball. Psychological
Science, 22, 423-428.
Leary, M. R. 1989. Self-presentational processes in leadership emergence and
effectiveness. In R. A. Giacalone & P. Rosenfeld (Ed.), Impression management
in the organization. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Leary, M. R., Barnes, B. D., & Griebel, C. 1986. Cognitive, affective, and attributional
effects of potential threats to self-esteem. Journal of Social and Clinical
Psychology, 4, 461-474.
Leary, M. R., & Kowalski, R. M. 1990. Impression management: A literature review and
two-component model. Psychological bulletin, 107(1), 34.
Levitt, Steven D. 2004. Why Are Gambling Markets Organized so Differently from
Financial Markets? The Economic Journal, 114 (April), 223–246.
Luca, M. 2014. Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of Yelp.com. Working
paper.
Luca, M., & Smith, J. 2013. Salience in quality disclosure: Evidence from the US News
college rankings. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 22 (1), 58-77.
Martins, Luis L. 2005. A Model of the Effects of Reputational Rankings on
Organizational

Change. Organization Science 16(6) 2005: 701-20.

McGinnis, L. P., & Gentry, J. W. 2009. Underdog consumption: An exploration into
meanings and motives. Journal of Business Research, 62(2), 191-199.

44

McGraw, A.P., Mellers, B.A., Ritov, I. 2004. The affective costs of overconfidence.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 17 (4), 281-295.
McNatt, D. B., & Judge, T. A. 2004. Boundary conditions of the Galatea effect: A field
experiment and constructive replication. Academy of Management
Journal, 47(4), 550-565.
Mills, M.P., and Mills, M.A. Every Datum Tells a Story. City Journal, 2014.
Modigliani, F. 1971. Monetary policy and consumption. Consumer spending and
monetary policy: the linkages, 9-84.
Muller, W., and Schotter, A. 2010. Workaholics and Drop Outs in Optimal
Organizations. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8 (4): 717-743.
Nelson, L.R., and Furst, M.L. 1972. An Objective Study of the Effects of Expectation on
Competitive Performance. The Journal of Psychology 81, 69-72.
Paharia, Keinan, N. Avery, J., Schor. J.B. 2011. "The Underdog Effect: The Marketing of
Disadvantage and Determination through Brand Biography." Journal of
Consumer Research 37(5): 775-790.
Ntoumanis, N., Taylor, I.M., Standage, M. 2010. Testing a model of antecedents and
consequences of defensive pessimism and self-handicapping in school physical
education. Journal of sports sciences, 28 (14).
Olson, E. G. 2013. Microsoft, GE, and the futility of ranking employees. Fortune
Magazine, 11/28/2013.

45

Pierce, J. R., Kilduff, G. J., Galinsky, A. D., & Sivanathan, N. 2014. From glue to
gasoline: How competition turns perspective-takers unethical. Psychological
Science, in press.

Pierce, L., and Snyder, J. 2012. Ethical Spillovers in Firms: Evidence from Vehicle
Emissions Testing. Management Science, 11: 1891-1903.
Pope, D. 2009. Reacting to rankings: Evidence from “America’s Best Hospitals”.
Journal of Health Economics 28 (6): 1154-1165.
Pope, D., and Schweitzer, M.E. 2011. Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent Bias in the
Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes. American Economic Review,
101: 129-157.
Reifman, A. S., Larrick, R. P., & Fein, S. 1991. Temper and temperature on the diamond:
The heat-aggression relationship in major-league baseball. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 17: 580-585.
Rhodewalt, F., Saltzman, A. T., & Wittmer, J. 1984. Self-handicapping among
competitive athletes: The role of practice in self-esteem protection. Basic and
Applied Social Psychology, 5(3), 197-209.
Romer, D. 2002. It’s Fourth Down and What Does the Bellman Equation Say? A
Dynamic Programming Analysis of Football Strategy. NBER Working Paper No.
9024.
Shalvi, S., Riejseger, G., Handgraaf, M.J.J., Appelt, K.C., ten Velden, F.S.,
Giacomantonio, M., De Dreu, C.K.W. 2013. Pay to walk away: Prevention buyers
prefer to avoid negotiation. Journal of Economic Psychology, 38, 40-49.
46

Simmons, J. P., & Nelson, L. D. 2006. Intuitive confidence: choosing between intuitive
and nonintuitive alternatives. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 135(3), 409.
Stevens, C.K., and Kristof, A.L. 1995. Making the right impression: A field study of
applicant impression management during job interviews. Journal of Applied
Psychology, Vol 80(5), 587-606.
Stigler, G. J. 1957. Perfect competition, historically contemplated. The Journal of
Political Economy, 1-17.
Van Trijp, H. C.M., W.D. Hoyer, J.J. Inman. 1996. Why Switch? Product Category-Level
Explanations for True Variety-Seeking Behavior. Journal of Marketing
Research, 33 (3): 281-292.
Wayne, S. J., & Liden, R. C. 1995. Effects of impression management on performance
ratings: A longitudinal study. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 232-260.
Weber, M., and Camerer, C.F. 1998. The disposition effect in securities trading: an
experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 33 (2):
167-184.
Weinberg, R. S., D. Yukelson, A. Jackson. 1980. Effect of public and private efficacy
expectations on competitive performance. Journal of Sport Psychology, 2 (4)
340-349.
Wooldridge, J.M. 2010. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Boston:
The MIT Press.

47

CHAPTER 1 TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Summary statistics describing key predictor variables.
Std. Dev.

10th Percentile

90th Percentile

3.76

19.56

29.09

382.32

32

972

12.17

.28

3.52

1.15

-1.26

1.26

Year 1999

9.92

1982

2009

Round 1.92

1.13

1

4

Mean
Age 24.09
Rank 389.35
Rank Ratio 2.42
Log of Rank Ratio 0

Table 2. Quitting percentages, winning percentages and sample size by first set outcome.
First Set Number of
% of Matches Won by
% of Players who
Outcome Matches
Players Achieving this
Quit after Achieving
First Set Outcome
this First Set
Outcome
Won Set 6-0 11,293
90.39%
.23%
6-1 35,102
87.23%
.29%
6-2 52,974
85.74%
.39%
6-3 73,775
82.15%
.46%
6-4 75,115
80.07%
.55%
7-5 29,028
80.18%
.59%
7-6 47,150
77.39%
.77%
Lost Set 6-7 47,150
22.61%
1.29%
5-7 29,028
19.82%
1.56%
4-6 75,115
19.93%
1.26%
3-6 73,775
17.85%
1.59%
2-6 52,974
14.26%
1.85%
1-6 35,102
12.77%
2.40%
0-6 11,293
9.61%
3.70%
Winning (all) 324,437
83.31%
0.47%
Losing (all) 324,437
16.69%
1.95%
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Table 3. Predicting Quitting
Favorite Indicator

Model 1
0.0016**
(0.0005)

Lost First Set x Favorite Indicator
Lost First Set Indicator

Model 2
-0.0006
(0.0004)
0.0053***
(0.0012)
0.0002
(0.001)

Model 3
0.0037***
(0.001)

Model 4
0.0002
(0.0005)

Model 5
0.0015***
(0.005)

0.0006^
(0.0003)
-0.0071
(0.0065)
0.0307
(0.0237)
-0.0003
(0.0004)
0.0002*
(0.0001)
-70.789
(50.523)
0.7924***
(0.1195)
-0.0008
(0.0019)
0.0008
(0.0019)

-0.0008^
(0.0004)
0.0016***
(0.0003)
-0.0231***
(0.0058)
0.0071***
(0.0018)
0.0014**
(0.0005)
-0.0005***
(0.0002)
-1.4843
(2.8828)
1.1486*
(0.7245)
0.002
(0.0026)
-0.002
(0.0026)

Round x Favorite
Player's Age
Player's Age^2 x 10^3
Prize Money x 10^8
Log(Rank Ratio)
Log(Rank Ratio)^2
Log(Rank Ratio)^3x 10^5
Log(Rank Ratio)^4 x 10^5
Player's Rank
Opponent's Rank

0.0016**
(0.0003)
-0.0231***
(0.0061)
0.0392
(0.0237)
0.0007*
(0.0003)
-0.0002*
(0.0001)
0.4893*
(0.1827)
0.109
(0.5155)
0.0024
(0.0025)
-0.0024
(0.0023)

Lost First Set x Log(Rank Ratio)
Lost First Set x Log(Rank Ratio)^2
Lost First Set x Log(Rank Ratio)^3 x 10^5
Lost First Set x Log(Rank Ratio)^4 x 10^5

0.0014
(0.0003)
-0.002
(0.0005)
0.0272*
(0.0086)
-0.0009**
(0.0003)
0.0005*
(0.0002)
40.63
(20.623)
20.177
(30.729)
0.0017
(0.0028)
-0.0017
(0.0028)
0.0023***
(0.0005)
-0.001
(0.0002)
-10.75**
(30.946)
20.867***
(0.7021)

0.0022***
(0.0005)
-0.0324***
(0.0091)
0.0456
(0.0403)
0.0006
(0.0006)
-0.0003
(0.0002)
0.2861
(40.658)
-0.2445
(10.225)
0.0057
(0.0048)
-0.0057
(0.0045)

Round x Log(Rank Ratio)

Player's Rank, Fully Interacted
with Log(Rank Ratio) Polynomial†
Opponent's Rank, Fully Interacted
with Log(Rank Ratio) Polynomial†
Match Surface Fixed Effects
Tour Fixed Effects
Tournament Round Fixed Effects
Tour x Round Fixed Effect Interactions
Year Fixed Effects
First Set Score Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

-0.0003
(0.0002)
0.007
(0.0058)
1.0543
(2.8828)
-0.1677
(0.2267)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Matches Included in Analysis

All

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Players who
completed the
first set
649860
0.0093

Round x Log(Rank Ratio)^2
Round x Log(Rank Ratio)^3 x 10^5
Round x Log(Rank Ratio)^4 x 10^5

Players who Players who won the
lost the first set
first set

All

Observations
657862
324930
324930
657862
R-squared
0.1625
0.0059
0.0021
0.1622
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates from a series of ordinary least squares regression models to predict whether a given player
quit (the dependent variable equals one if a player quit and zero otherwise). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
†T his interaction includes one term for each of the terms of the log(rank ratio) polynomial, or four terms total.
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Table 4. Predicting Winning
Favorite Indicator

Model 1
0.0021
(0.0013)

Lost First Set x Favorite Indicator
Lost First Set Indicator
Player's Age
Player's Age^2 x 10^3
Prize Money x 10^8
Log(Rank Ratio)
Log(Rank Ratio)^2
Log(Rank Ratio)^3x 10^5
Log(Rank Ratio)^4 x 10^5
Player's Rank
Opponent's Rank

-0.0035**
(0.0011)
0.0371
(0.0205)
0.002
(0.0948)
0.0747***
(0.0007)
-20.804e-5
(0.0005)
-0.0013
(0.0004)
-0.2005
(0.2132)
0.0144*
(0.0067)
-0.0145*
(0.0066)

Lost First Set x Log(Rank Ratio)
Lost First Set x Log(Rank Ratio)^2
Lost First Set x Log(Rank Ratio)^3 x 10^5
Lost First Set x Log(Rank Ratio)^4 x 10^5
Player's Rank, Fully Interacted
with Log(Rank Ratio) Polynomial†
Opponent's Rank, Fully Interacted
with Log(Rank Ratio) Polynomial†
Match Surface Fixed Effects
Tour Fixed Effects
Tournament Round Fixed Effects
Tour x Round Fixed Effect Interactions
Year Fixed Effects
First Set Score Fixed Effects

Yes

Matches Included in Analysis

All

Observations
R-squared

Model 2
Model 3
-0.0021
-0.0024
(0.003)
(0.0028)
0.0006
(0.0055)
-0.4511***
(0.0531)
-0.0032**
-0.0045***
(0.0011)
(0.0013)
0.0332
0.0532*
(0.0202)
(0.0253)
0.0095
-0.042
(0.063)
(0.1082)
0.0793
0.0819**
(0.002)
(0.002)
-0.0090***
0.0101***
(0.0008)
(0.0007)
-0.0008***
-0.0004**
(0.0001)
(0.0002)
40.219
-0.0002**
(40.55)
(0.0003)
0.0137
0.0330*
(0.0079)
(0.0172)
-0.0137
-0.0325
(0.0079)
(0.0142)
-0.0001
(0.0029)
0.0180***
(0.0004)
0.1699
(130.0937)
-440.6075***
(20.5414)
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

657862
0.4447

Yes

Yes

Model 4
-0.0029
(0.0028)

-0.0021
(0.0018)
0.0158
(0.0351)
0.0464
(0.1104)
0.0826**
(0.0027)
-0.0107***
(0.001)
-0.0005**
(0.0002)
0.0002**
(0.0005)
0.0324*
(0.0154)
-0.0325
(0.0149)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Players who
Players who Players who won
completed the
lost the first set
the first set
first set
649860
324930
324930
0.4467
0.0558
0.0557

Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates from a series of ordinary least squares regression models to predict
whether a given player quit (the dependent variable equals one if a player quit and zero otherwise). Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
†T his interaction includes one term for each of the terms of the log(rank ratio) polynomial, or four terms total.
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Table 5. Placebo Discontinuity Tests
Higher than Median Indicator
Player's Age
Player's Age^2 x 10^3
Prize Money x 10^8
Log(Rank Ratio)
Log(Rank Ratio)^2
Log(Rank Ratio)^3x 10^5
Log(Rank Ratio)^4 x 10^5
Player's Rank
Opponent's Rank
Player's Rank, Fully Interacted
with Log(Rank Ratio) Polynomial†
Opponent's Rank, Fully Interacted
with Log(Rank Ratio) Polynomial†
Match Surface Fixed Effects
Tour Fixed Effects
Tournament Round Fixed Effects
Tour x Round Fixed Effect Interactions
Year Fixed Effects
First Set Score Fixed Effects
Matches Included in Analysis

Model 1
0.0011
(0.0009)
0.0017***
(0.0004)
0.0255**
(0.0088)
0.0633
(0.0346)
-0.0006
(0.0028)
-0.0004
(0.0022)
-0.0008
(0.0007)
-0.0001
(0.0006)
-0.1517
(0.2073)
-0.1517
(0.2073)
Yes

Model 2
0.0008
(0.0009)
0.0013***
(0.0004)
-0.0186**
(0.0082)
0.0154
(0.032)
0.0003
(0.0034)
-10.914
(0.0025)
0.0001
(0.0007)
-3.0746
(60.485)
0.2432
(0.3477)
0.2432
(0.3477)
Yes

Model 3
0.0018
(0.0013)
0.0021***
(0.0006)
-0.0306**
(0.011)
0.0478
(0.0473)
0.0006
(0.0048)
-0.0001
(0.0035)
-0.0002
(0.001)
-0.0001
(0.0009)
0.1861
(0.3707)
0.1861
(0.3707)
Yes

Model 4
0.0013
(0.0018)
0.0022**
(0.0008)
-0.0335*
(0.0162)
0.0517
(0.0722)
-0.0063
(0.0068)
0.0052
(0.006)
-0.0015
(0.002)
0.0001
(0.0002)
-20.017**
(0.4172)
-20.017**
(0.4172)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Log(rank
ratio)<0

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
First set losers,
First set losers,
Log(rank ratio)>0
Log(rank
Log(rank ratio)>0
ratio)<0
328425
197234
126610
0.159
0.0055
0.0066

Observations
328,425
R-squared
0.1696
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates from a series of ordinary least squares regression models to predict
whether a given player withdrew from a match before it began (the dependent variable equals one if a player
withdrew and zero otherwise). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
†This interaction includes one term for each of the terms of the log(rank ratio) polynomial, or four terms total.
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Table 6. Predicting Walkovers
Model 1
-0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0003**
(0.0001)
-0.0037
(0.0024)
-0.0078
(0.0067)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0002
(60.464)
-10.624
(0.0001)
-80.202
(0.2077)
-0.0004
(0.001)
0.0004
(0.001)
Yes

Favorite Indicator
Player's Age
Player's Age^2 x 10^3
Prize Money x 10^8
Log(Rank Ratio)
Log(Rank Ratio)^2
Log(Rank Ratio)^3x 10^5
Log(Rank Ratio)^4 x 10^5
Player's Rank
Opponent's Rank
Player's Rank, Fully Interacted
with Log(Rank Ratio) Polynomial†
Opponent's Rank, Fully Interacted
with Log(Rank Ratio) Polynomial†
Match Surface Fixed Effects
Tour Fixed Effects
Tournament Round Fixed Effects
Tour x Round Fixed Effect Interactions
Year Fixed Effects
First Set Score Fixed Effects
Matches Included in Analysis
Observations
R-squared
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
All
656850
0.0017

Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates from a series of ordinary least
squares regression models to predict whether a given player withdrew from a
match before it began (the dependent variable equals one if a player withdrew
and zero otherwise). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Note
that we only reproduce Model 1 from Table 3 with this alternate dependent
variable and not Models 2-4 because Models 2-4 require information about a
player’s performance in the first set of a match. When a player chooses to
“walkover”, he forfeits a match before it begins, thus precluding a first set
outcome from arising.
†This interaction includes one term for each of the terms of the log(rank ratio)
polynomial, or four terms total.
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Figure 1. Example portion of a tournament draw (Madrid Open 2005).
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Figure 2. The relationship between a target player’s log rank ratio relative to his
opponent and the target player’s likelihood of quitting and winning the match. We depict
the 50% of matches that are closest to the underdog-favorite threshold. A shows
outcomes for first set losers; B for first set winners. I shows likelihood of quitting, II
shows likelihood of winning the match. Plots in the same column have the same scale.
Solid and dashed lines depict the fitted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals,
respectively (IA from Table 2, Model 2, IIA from Table 2, Model 3, IB from Table 3,
Model 2, and IIB from Table 3, Model 3). Fitted probabilities are calculated by taking the
mean of all predicted values from the tested models. Lower dashed lines are the .025
quantile of predicted values from tested models, and upper dashed lines are the .975
quantile of predicted values from the tested models.
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CHAPTER 1, APPENDIX A: MAIN RESULTS WITH LOGIT SPECIFICATION
Table A1. Predicting Quitting with a Logit Specification
Model 1
Favorite Indicator
0.1193***
(0.019)
Lost First Set x Favorite Indicator
Lost First Set Indicator

Model 2
0.0294
(0.0799)
0.1822**
(0.0828)
0.4750***
(0.0804)

Model 3
0.2077***
(0.0528)

Model 4
0.0506
(0.1242)

Model 5
0.2153***
(0.0719)

0.1085
(0.0472)
-0.0014
(0.0008)
2.9315
(1.7190)
-0.0573
(0.0933)
-0.0089
(0.0124)
-0.0106
(0.0034)
0.0009
(0.0002)
-2.1080
(0.5880)
2.1081
(0.5880)

-0.0450
(0.0298)
0.1386***
(0.0232)
-0.0021***
(0.0004)
5.3874***
(1.2305)
0.1829***
(0.0520)
-0.0374
(0.0253)
-0.0070
(0.0037)
0.0004
(0.0014)
0.2623
(0.2743)
-0.2623
(0.2743)

Round x Favorite
Player's Age
Player's Age^2 x 10^3
Prize Money x 10^8
Log(Rank Ratio)
Log(Rank Ratio)^2
Log(Rank Ratio)^3x 10^5
Log(Rank Ratio)^4 x 10^5
Player's Rank
Opponent's Rank

0.1351***
(0.0272)
-0.1961***
(0.0588)
5.6320***
(1.8116)
0.055
(0.0485)
-0.0396***
(0.004)
-0.1555
(0.3077)
0.7327
(0.6213)
0.1415***
(0.0433)
-0.1415***
(0.0433)

Lost First Set x Log(Rank Ratio)
Lost First Set x Log(Rank Ratio)^2
Lost First Set x Log(Rank Ratio)^3 x 10^5
Lost First Set x Log(Rank Ratio)^4 x 10^5

0.1398
(0.0280)
-2.0961
(0.5328)
2.6376
(1.3594)
-0.2084
(0.0611)
0.0020
(0.0307)
0.0067
(0.0084)
-0.0017
(0.0024)
0.3354
(0.3756)
-0.3353
(0.3756)
0.3334***
(0.0516)
-0.0293
(0.0293)
-0.0104
(0.0077)
0.0020
(0.0020)

0.1416***
(0.0295)
-0.0022***
(0.0006)
3.6581**
(1.5300)
0.0861
(0.3496)
-0.0395**
(0.0155)
-0.0004
(0.0042)
0.0006
(0.0012)
0.5945
(0.3079)
-0.5945
(0.3079)

Round x Log(Rank Ratio)

Player's Rank, Fully Interacted
with Log(Rank Ratio) Polynomial†
Opponent's Rank, Fully Interacted
with Log(Rank Ratio) Polynomial†
Match Surface Fixed Effects
Tour Fixed Effects
Tournament Round Fixed Effects
Tour x Round Fixed Effect Interactions
Year Fixed Effects
First Set Score Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

-0.0561**
(0.0211)
-0.0014
(0.0086)
0.0022
(0.0017)
0.0002
(0.0005)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Matches Included in Analysis

All

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Players
who won
the first set
324930
0.0021

Round x Log(Rank Ratio)^2
Round x Log(Rank Ratio)^3 x 10^5
Round x Log(Rank Ratio)^4 x 10^5

Observations
Pseudo R-squared
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

657862
0.1625

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Players who Players who
completed the lost the first
first set
set
649860
324930
0.1622
0.0059

All
657862
0.0093

Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates from a series of ordinary least squares regression models to predict whether
a given player quit (the dependent variable equals one if a player quit and zero otherwise). Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
†This interaction includes one term for each of the terms of the log(rank ratio) polynomial, or four terms total.

55

CHAPTER 1, APPENDIX B: INTERVIEWS WITH DIVISION I COLLEGIATE
VARSITY TENNIS PLAYERS
To gain deeper insight into the decision to quit mid-match, we conducted
interviews with Division I varsity collegiate tennis players. Our analyses in Study 1
reveal different quitting behavior among favorites and underdogs. In this qualitative
study, we extend our investigation of the mechanism underlying our Study 1 findings.
We postulate that ranking systems affect quitting decisions by creating favorites and
underdogs. In our interviews with tennis players, we confirm that tennis players both pay
attention to rankings and form performance expectations based on relative rankings, and
we link these performance expectations with quitting. We argue that impression
management strategies such as self-handicapping by quitting are more attractive to
favorites than underdogs because for favorites, losses are more aversive. Finally, we
investigate the existence and effectiveness of quitting as an impression management tool.
Specifically, we explore the extent to which quitting creates ambiguity with respect to
why a favorite did not win, and whether competitive athletes are aware of this impression
management tool.
Methods
We conducted structured interviews with Division I varsity tennis players in two
rounds. First, we conducted 16 interviews at a Division I collegiate women’s tennis
tournament hosted by the University of Pennsylvania. We conducted 28 additional
interviews over the phone with male and female varsity tennis players recruited by
contacting the tennis coaches at the 100 top ranked men’s and women’s Division I tennis
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teams.8 Athletes from 16 different U.S. universities participated in our study (N=44, 86%
female). We asked all participants a series of pre-determined questions from a script (see
Appendix C), which we adapted slightly based on participants’ responses.
The interviews focused on experiences that participants had in competitive junior
(age ≤ 18) tennis tournaments before college when players compete individually (rather
than in teams at the collegiate level) and each player seeks to maximize their national
ranking (which directly influences their college prospects). Rather than referring to
interviewees by name, we refer to each player by number.
After conducting interviews, three research assistants coded each interview for (1)
the frequency with which a player was aware of his/her own ranking and his/her
opponents’ ranking (coded as always, sometimes, never, or unknown, Fleiss’s
kappa=0.70), (2), how losing to an underdog compares to losing to a favorite (coded as
better than, the same as, worse than, or unknown, Fleiss’s kappa=0.56), and (3) whether
an athlete believes that players retire from matches even when they are not injured (coded
as yes, no, or unknown, Fleiss’s kappa=0.40). In cases of disagreement between raters,
we used the majority opinion.
Findings
The importance of rankings. Tennis players reported that rankings were very
important to them. The overwhelming majority of athletes were either “always” (41%,
n=18) or “sometimes” (41%, n=18) aware of their opponent’s ranking and how it

8

Specifically, players were recruited using the following process: first, we emailed coaches and asked them
to ask players on their team to email us. We then set up individual interview slots with each athlete who
contacted us.
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compared to their own before the beginning of a match. Only 14% (n=6) reported that
they were “never” aware of it, and 5% (N=2) did not provide enough information to be
certain. Two respondents reported that some junior players are “obsessed” with rankings
(TP 5, TP 23). Other players reported that they would “do a lot of research” (TP 17),
checking their rankings “every day” (TP 42), “once a week” (TP 8) or “whenever the new
rankings came out” (TP 12). Many tennis players reported that rankings were often on
their mind: one said she was “always wondering” about her ranking (TP 2), and another
mentioned being “always kind of aware” of it “ever since I was little” (TP 13). One
player described the extent to which concern about rankings permeated her environment
as follows:
“[Rankings are] something that a lot of people think about… I definitely knew my
ranking, just from my parents, or other people, they would tell me… Even if I
didn’t check, I would still know, it’s one of those things that everybody knows.”
(TP 6)
Our interviews revealed that not only athletes themselves, but parents, friends,
and others are aware of athletes’ rankings as they improve and worsen. We find strong
evidence that rankings loom large in tennis players’ minds.
Using rankings to form performance expectations. We conceptualize ranking
as an indication of a player’s relative skill level. Our interviews confirm that athletes
perceive rankings in this way. One tennis player we interviewed described the notion
succinctly by saying “people use [ranking] as a measure of how good someone is” (TP 6).
Tournament schedules are published in advance of matches, and one player described her
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thought process before starting a tournament by saying “you would know the
opponents… their strength; the ranking says a lot about that” (TP 8). Rankings enabled
athletes to “get a sense” (TP 12) of an opponent, said one player, and another said that
rankings “led up to your expectations of how you had to perform in the match to win”
(TP 31). Yet another tennis player (TP 6) believed that such expectations could form
even unintentionally, explaining: “whether you’re conscious of it or not, you definitely
have an expectation about [how a match will go].” The evidence suggests that tennis
players tend to know their opponents’ rankings and use this information to form
expectations about match outcomes before matches have begun.
The problem of high expectations for favorites. Several interviewees expressed
a belief that ranking systems could have a downside for favorites. One player (TP 11)
expressed this downside in terms of fear, saying “some people who are really high[ly]
ranked have a fear of losing, like losing status.” One player expressed that status as a
favorite made it so she had everything to lose:
“I was always more nervous when I was playing someone you were supposedly
supposed to beat. You were always very aware of it because everyone's always
like, ‘Oh I'm playing a seed,’ or that sort of stuff. If you are a seed, you've been in
that situation, so you know what other people are thinking. Whenever someone
plays a seed it means they have nothing to lose and they're going to give it their
all, while you have everything to lose.” (TP 23)
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These comments highlight the risk that tennis players’ attention to relative
rankings may create added performance pressure for match favorites that can have
unpleasant emotional consequences.
Favorites who lose fall short of expectations. Our interviews revealed that
tennis players perceive losses to players with inferior rankings (commonly referred to as
“upsets”) as especially aversive. Most players (68%, n=30) reported that losing to an
underdog was worse than losing to a favorite. No athletes reported that losing to an
underdog was better. Some players either characterized losing to an underdog as the same
as losing to a favorite (16%, n=7) or did not provide enough information to be certain
(16%, n=7).
The tennis players we interviewed described many reasons why upsets are more
aversive than losses to better players. Most of the reasons related to impression
management. For example, one player described the detrimental impact of losing to an
opponent with an inferior ranking (what she called a “big loss”) on a player’s reputation
in the tightly-knit tennis community as follows:
“Friends of mine, they’re like ‘oh my gosh, this girl lost to this girl, I can’t believe
she beat her’… it’s a big deal. Tennis is such a small community that word
spreads. If you have a big win it’s a big deal, a big loss is a big deal. Everyone
wants to know what’s going on with you, and what other people are doing.” (TP
5)
Several other athletes expressed similar sentiments about losing to worse
opponents, all emphasizing the embarrassing impression management consequences
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associated with losing when you are the favorite. The first explained the shock to peers,
coaches and the family of an upset:
“People are expecting you to win, and they hear that you lose, and it shocks them.
If they didn’t watch the match, they don’t know what happened… you could say
it’s embarrassing.” (TP 4)
A second highlighted the feeling that you have let others down when you lose such a
match:
“[You feel] disappointed, feel like you’re letting your parents down, embarrassed
too, about what other players might think of you, or your practice partners,
definitely disappointment from your coaches.” (TP 8)
A third emphasized the unpleasant gossip surrounding upsets:
“people will say ‘oh, so-and-so lost to so-and-so. Can you believe that she beat
her?” (TP 28)
These statements underscore that players are concerned about the impressions that
others in their community have of them. They further highlight that tennis players view
upsets as embarrassing and harmful to their reputation within their community.
Strategic Quitting. Players we interviewed indicated that quitting can be
preferable to experiencing an upset, because it enables athletes to make the attribution
that their loss to an opponent with an inferior ranking was due to external factors (injury)
rather than internal factors (incompetence). Based on three raters’ codes, we determined
that 86% of athletes (N=38) were aware of other players who had quit matches without
being ill or injured. Eleven percent of the players we interviewed (N=5) reported that
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they were not aware of this occurring, and 1 athlete did not provide enough information
to be certain. One athlete described an acquaintance’s particularly extreme quitting
behavior as follows: “anytime she would start to lose, she would physically get sick on
the court, and retire. It would happen every single tournament” (TP 12). Another
described an opponent who “retired on my match point” (TP 2). These accounts provide
an initial indication that quitting could have a psychological component independent of
illness or injury. Providing more insight into the psychology behind such retirements, one
athlete we interviewed described quitting as a “way out”:
“[Quitting] is kind of a way out because you can say ‘oh I lost because.’ It’s not ‘I
lost because the girl was better than me,’ it’s ‘I lost because I’m hurt,’ or ‘I lost
because I couldn’t play anymore.’” (TP 11)
Another tennis player described a strategic reason for quitting to an opponent that you are
expected to defeat:
“Sometimes, for players who do look up records a lot, if they would have seen [a
loss to a worse opponent], they would have had maybe more confidence going
into a match with her, or they would have seen her as not as much of a
competitor. She does have weaknesses and she can have a bad day and lose, so
sometimes you would rather just have the retirement on your record than a loss9.”
(TP 8)

Retiring and losing have exactly the same consequences for players’ rankings and earnings. The only
consequences of retiring that are different from the consequences of losing are impression management
consequences.
9
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Finally, comments in the interviews we conducted suggested that quitting is
particularly attractive to players who are losing to an opponent with a ranking that is
inferior to theirs and thus the threat of an upset looms. The following story offers one
example of this:
“I have walked off the court... Sometimes I'd win the first set, and then lose the
second, and then at the beginning of the third, I would be able to gauge how well
I'd be able to do... If I know I've lost it's just 'eh'." (TP 18, italics added)
Another player told the story of an opponent who was favored to defeat her but
who quit mid-match against her when losing, explaining “before that, many times she had
beat me, and she probably decided that she shouldn’t lose” (TP 2). A final interviewee
summed up the motive players have to quit mid-match when facing the possibility of an
upset in order to save face:
“If [players are] losing to someone that they don’t think they should be losing to,
they’d rather make it seem like they’re injured and they can’t keep playing or
they’re sick and they can’t keep playing, almost as an excuse as to why they were
even down in the match, rather than just losing completely and making it look like
the other person is better than them.” (TP 12)
Discussion
The themes that emerged in more than forty interviews with tennis players in
Study 2 provide support for our theory of quitting when facing the prospect of an upset in
order to save face. Interviewees expressed that losing as a favorite is more aversive than
losing as an underdog because favorites fall short of their own and others’ expectations
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when they lose. Because of this, participants indicated that favorites who are losing can
quit to create ambiguity about the reason they failed to win. These findings support to our
theoretical explanation for the different quitting rates of favorites and underdogs.
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CHAPTER 1, APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR DIVISION I
COLLEGIATE VARSITY TENNIS PLAYERS
Below are the questions that were asked during interviews with varsity collegiate
athletes, coaches, and trainers for the study described in Appendix B. These questions
served as an outline and starting point for discussions. Questions were adapted based on
responses and based on the role (athlete, coach, trainer) of the interviewee.
Please think back on your experience playing competitive tennis before college.
1. Were you ever ranked by any tennis organizations (e.g., the USTA)?
2. Before starting a match, were you usually aware of the rank of your opponent and how
it compared to your rank?
3. Did you feel any differently (e.g., different emotions, different expectations) before
matches when you were favored to beat your opponent (based on your relative rankings)
than before matches when you were the underdog?
4. Did losing to a better-ranked opponent feel any different to you than losing to a worseranked opponent?
5. Did you feel different levels of embarrassment when losing to a better-ranked vs.
worse-ranked opponent?
6. What are some of the reasons why players typically retire from tennis matches?
7. When you played competitive junior tennis, did you ever hear about someone who
retired from a match for a reason other than illness or injury? Please explain.
8. When you played junior tennis, did you feel that retiring was more or less
embarrassing than losing?
9. Do you think that competitive tennis players ever retire to avoid the embarrassment of
a loss to someone they feel they should be able to defeat?
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CHAPTER 2

The Role of Incentive Salience in Habit Formation
Joint work with: Prof. Katherine L. Milkman, Prof. Leslie K. John, Prof. Francesca Gino

Chapter 2 Abstract:
Recent research has examined the residual effects of incentives: by altering behavior,
incentives can cause subjects to form habits that persist after the original behavioraltering incentives are removed. We conducted a field experiment among users of a
pedometer tracking app. We offered incentives to all subjects, and varied the salience of
the incentives. We found that incentives were effective at increasing the daily steps of
incentivized subjects. We also found that salient incentives were more effective that nonsalient incentives in creating exercise habits. We discuss implications for research on
habit formation and exercise.
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INTRODUCTION
Approximately 70% of Americans were overweight or obese as of 2008 (Flegal et
al. 2010), and although exercise promotes weight loss, half of Americans exercise
insufficiently (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014). Obesity has significant
negative externalities, and some scholars have called for large global policy changes in
order to stop the obesity “epidemic” (Malik et al., 2013). Improving individuals’ exercise
habits would be a crucial part of any viable plan to reduce obesity worldwide.
An established way to effectively increase individuals’ exercise behaviors is to
offer incentives for exercise. Previous studies have successfully offered money (Charness
& Gneezy, 2009; Acland & Levy 2011) as a means of increasing gym visits. Incentives
for exercise can not only increase exercise behavior, but help individuals form habits that
persist after incentives are removed (Charness & Gneezy, 2009). Helping people form
habits is a promising approach to improving exercise behavior because the net effect of a
habit over a long time period can be much larger than a one-time reaction to an incentive.
Incentives that help people form habits can therefore be an inexpensive means for
effecting meaningful, long-term behavior change. In this paper, we add to research on
incentives and habit formation by testing the effects of making existing incentives for
exercise salience as a means of promoting the formation of exercise habits.
Much of the previous research on incentives and habit formation hinges on an
important assumption: that merely offering incentives is enough to change behavior.
Research that makes this assumption tends to focus almost exclusively on incentive size
as a determinant of the reaction to an incentive. However, individual inattention is a
common problem, and has far-reaching effects on consumer choice (Grubb, 2014).
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People may leave potential surplus on the table if they are inattentive to the incentives in
front of them (de Clippel et al., 2014). Because of this, incentive schemes depend not
only on incentive size, but also on incentive salience. The salience of information
influences responses to taxation (Chetty et al., 2007), purchase decisions in car markets
(Busse et al., 2013), and reactions to college rankings (Luca and Smith, 2013).
Making incentives salient enough to capture attention can be quite difficult. A
great deal of marketing research confronts the problem of how to capture and maintain
consumer attention. Salience can depend on factors as simple as the position and
placement of items on shelves (Chandon et al., 2009), the size of text (Pieters and
Wiedel, 2004), and the colors of advertisements (Lohse, 1996). Attention to marketing
has large effects on responses to incentives (Ratneshwar et al., 1997). Our research has
implications for the marketing literature because we explore the difference between
reactions to incentives that are made salient and those that are not.
To investigate the impact of incentive salience on behavioral reactions to
incentives, we conducted a randomized, controlled trial with two treatment arms. The
experiment’s subjects were users of an app that tracks pedometer use. We offered
monetary incentives to all subjects. All subjects had access to information about the
existence and size of incentives. We manipulated the salience of incentives by varying
whether subjects received frequent emails containing details about the incentives.
Subjects in the “salient” treatment condition received frequent emails about incentives,
and subjects in the control condition received no emails about incentives. We measured
the effects of our salience manipulation by comparing subjects in the two conditions
during and after our intervention. We were especially interested in different walking
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levels after the end of our intervention because these provide evidence for habit
formation.
This research addresses several other potential problems in previous habit
formation studies. First, current pedometer technology provides measures of personal
exercise that are more precise than self-reports or other noisy measures that appear in
some research. Second, pedometers measure all walking throughout an entire day,
whereas other exercise studies measure gym visits, and cannot capture what happens
before or after visiting the gym. Finally, a great deal of research on habit formation relies
on interventions that last several months (e.g. Charness and Gneezy, 2009). Our
intervention lasted only two weeks, and addresses the question of whether a shorter (and
therefore less expensive) intervention can also create habits.
RESULTS
We randomly assigned 2,055 pedometer users to one of two experimental
conditions. All users received incentives for walking and had access to information about
incentives. Users in the “salient” incentives condition received extra emails containing
information about offered incentives. Users in the control incentives condition did not
receive extra emails. As expected, we found no significant differences in the observable
pre-treatment characteristics of the two experimental groups (Table 1). See the Methods
section for more information on selection of participants.
Figure 1 shows the differences in mean daily steps taken by participants in the
salient incentives and control incentives conditions before, during, and after our
intervention. Table 2 shows mean daily steps for both groups, by two week periods
during and after the intervention. As predicted, users in the salient incentives condition
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had a higher level of mean daily steps both during and after the intervention. To test the
significance of these differences, we turn to regression analyses. We are able to identify
the effects of our intervention with considerable precision by controlling for individual
differences in pre-intervention propensity to walk while identifying off of differences
between our experimental groups in during- and post-intervention behavior. Our analysis
uses a difference-in-differences regression strategy, which in general enables
comparisons between groups and over time. For our research, the difference-indifferences strategy enables us to compare the mean daily steps of the subjects in the
salient group with the mean daily steps of subjects in the control group during, shortly
after, and long after our experimental intervention (see the Methods section for more
details).
Table 3 shows results of ordinary least squares regressions predicting daily steps
with fixed effects for each participant on each day of the week (see Methods for more
details about our regression model specification). The primary predictor variables of
interest are interactions between an indicator for our salient incentives condition and
indicators for each of the two-week time periods studied (two weeks during the
intervention, two-weeks immediately post-intervention, and weeks three and four postintervention). Standard errors are clustered by subject and reported in parentheses.
Coefficients in these regressions estimate the difference between salient and control
incentives groups’ mean daily steps during each two-week time period of interest during
and post-intervention.
Table 3, Model 1 reports the results of this regression estimated on an intent-totreat basis. As we predicted, salient incentive condition participants took significantly
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more daily steps during the intervention than control participants (332 extra steps, 95%
CI: 125.0, 538.5). Most importantly in light of our hypotheses about habit formation,
participants in the salient incentives condition took more daily steps than those in the
control condition for the two weeks after our intervention (297 extra steps, 95% CI: 58.4,
534.9), although the effect dissipated three-to-four weeks after our intervention (132
extra steps, 95% CI: -140.7, 403.8).
One concern about the above results is that they could be driven by differential
use of FitBits rather than differential exercise if salient incentives prompted participants
to wear and sync their Fitbits more often than control participants without actually
changing their walking habits. One way of addressing this concern is to examine
differences in attrition by condition. Attrition in FitBit use is indicated by a user
recording zero steps for a given day. Attrition could also be indicated by a user recording
a small nonzero number of steps, for example if he or she only wore a FitBit for a brief
part of a day. A previous study of walking with an adult subject pool consisting of several
thousand people and no attrition found that subjects took fewer than 3,000 steps on less
than 1% of observed days, and subjects took fewer than 2,000 steps on no observed days
(Hivensalo et al., 2011). We therefore used 2,000 steps as a cutoff for defining attrition:
days on which a given user recorded fewer than 2,000 steps were regarded as a failure to
properly wear and sync FitBits. Figure S3 in the Supporting Information shows the
frequency of different step counts greater than 0 and less than 3,000 in our observed data.
We call a subject an “attriter” if the subject records fewer than 2,000 total steps on
a given day (indicating failed FitBit use). Table 2 shows the numbers of attriters in each
experimental condition, during each time period. We performed two-sample proportion
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tests to determine whether the salient and control groups had different attrition rates
during, shortly after, and long after our intervention. We see no significant (at the 0.05
level) differences between the attrition rates in the experimental conditions during,
shortly after, or long after our experimental intervention.
A second approach to our regression strategy is to replace our intent-to-treat
analysis with an even more conservative test of our hypothesis by deleting all person-day
observations from both experimental conditions that show less than 2,000 steps logged.
Table 3, Model 2 shows this regression estimated only on the subset of data containing
observations of daily steps that are greater than 2,000. Because it measures differences in
steps rather than differences in attrition, it provides evidence that the observed effects are
actually due to different activity levels.
The coefficient estimates reported in Table 3, Model 2 provide more evidence that
users are walking different amounts depending on experimental condition and that the
observed effects are not artifacts of differential attrition. According to the estimates from
this model, non-attriting subjects in the salient condition took more steps than control
subjects during the intervention (220 steps, 95% CI, 55.3, 385.6) and up to two weeks
after the intervention (194 steps, 95% CI, 6.9, 380.8), but not 3-4 weeks after the
intervention (105 steps, 95% CI, -133.3, 343.8). Although the coefficient estimates in this
model are slightly smaller than those in Model 1, the effects of the intervention during the
intervention period and for the two weeks post-intervention remain large, positive and
significant, indicating that differences between experimental groups cannot simply be
explained by differential attrition.
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All results reported thus far have compared users across our two experimental
conditions (salient incentives and control incentives). Both experimental groups, however
received the same inflated incentives during our two week intervention period. Thus,
while we have measured the effect of incentive salience on behavior change, we have not
measured the effect of the incentives themselves. Of course, this was not the goal of our
research, but it is useful to understand how magnifying the salience of incentives
compares with providing incentives in the first place. In order to accomplish this, we
turn to a difference-in-differences regression estimation strategy and compare the change
in pre- versus during- and post-intervention behavior of participants in our control group
versus participants in a holdout group who are who were excluded from our experiment
only because they had previously participated in a similar but unrelated experiment, but
who otherwise would have been eligible for participation. Because this group met the
study’s eligibility criteria based on observable characteristics, it provides an ideal control
group for comparisons with experimental subjects in a difference-in-differences analysis
(see Methods for more on our difference-in-differences estimation strategy).
Table 4 shows results of ordinary least squares regressions predicting daily steps
with fixed effects for user-day-of-week. The predictor variables are interactions of
experimental status (in experiment, salient condition) and two-week time periods.
Standard errors are clustered by subject and reported in parentheses. The first three
coefficients in these regressions estimate the difference between control users’ and
holdout users’ mean daily steps at each two-week time period – that is, they estimate the
effects of the incentives themselves. The second three coefficients in these regressions
estimate the difference between salient users’ and control users’ mean daily steps at each
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two-week time period – that is, they estimate the marginal effect of salience on responses
to incentives.
The results reported in Table 4, Model 1, indicate that control incentive group
subjects did not differ from holdout participants during the intervention or shortly after it,
though they did differ 3-4 weeks after the intervention (difference of 597 steps, 95% CI,
286.1, 907.2) The size and significance of the coefficients estimated in Table 4, Model 1,
indicate that although making incentives salient was effective in changing behavior as
shown in Table 3, incentives alone without any emphasis did not meaningfully alter
steps. In order to account for possible differential attrition between groups as discussed
above, Table 4, Model 2 shows this regression estimated only on the subset of
participant-day observations including fewer than 2,000 steps (see the description of
Table 3, Model 2 for a discussion of the reasons for this).

METHODS
Subjects
Our study population was composed of users of an online platform called AchieveMint
that rewards its users for engaging in health-related activities. AchieveMint allows FitBit
users to link their accounts and automatically records the minute-by-minute step counts,
which are then transferred automatically to AchieveMint. Everyone in our study
population was an AchieveMint user who had linked a FitBit with their AchieveMint
account. Every time an AchieveMint user takes 200 steps, he or she earns one point from
the platform. Points are redeemable for cash rewards: after a user has taken 200,000
steps, he or she will earn $1.00. Users receive a check for every $25 earned. AchieveMint
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sends all users a weekly update email that contains information on a user’s current
number of earned points.
Of the AchieveMint users who had linked FitBit devices, we selected 2,055 for
our study based on three eligibility criteria. First, AchieveMint users who had been part
of a previous, similar study were excluded. Second, AchieveMint users whose historical
usage data indicated that they opened less than one email per month from AchieveMint
were excluded. Third, AchieveMint users whose historical usage data indicated that they
were above the 70th percentile for mean daily steps were excluded. These exclusions were
based on calculations that indicated that they would yield about 90% statistical power for
our experiment to detect a 15% difference between conditions in step counts over a two
week period using two-sided t-tests. Our experimental protocol was approved by the
Institutional Review Board of the University of Pennsylvania. A waiver of informed
consent was approved per Federal regulations (45 CFR 46.116(d)) in light of the fact that
the study was minimum risk, did not adversely affect the rights and welfare of
participants, and could not be practicably carried out without the waiver.
Procedures
AchieveMint users meeting eligibility requirements were randomly assigned to
one of two experimental conditions: a “salient” incentives condition and a “control”
incentives condition. All study participants received the same incentive to walk in the
form of a “point multiplier,” such that the AchieveMint points that they earned were
multiplied by 40 for two weeks (that is, for every 200,000 steps, they earned $40.00
instead of the usual $1). Participants in the “salient” incentives condition (n=1,027)
received emails (in addition to AchieveMint’s standard weekly update emails) detailing
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the duration and magnitude of these point multipliers. Participants in the control incentive
condition (n=1,028) did receive point multipliers, but did not receive extra emails about
the point multipliers. All participants were able to track their AchieveMint points through
the AchieveMint app, website, and through standard weekly update emails.
Participants received point multipliers for two weeks from Jan. 27, 2015 through
Feb. 9, 2015. Participants in the salient condition received a kickoff email on Jan. 26,
2015: the day before the start of the point multiplier incentives. This email featured the
subject line: “New Program to Encourage You to Walk (earn Bonus Points).” The
contents of this email (depicted in Supporting Information, Figure S1) explained to
participants that they had been enrolled in a program to increase their walking. It showed
a calendar with point multipliers highlighted each day when they would be rewarded
(every day for the next two weeks). Salient incentive condition participants also received
email reminders about the program every other day for its duration (seven additional
emails on days 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 13 of the experiment), which contained all of the
same information including the schedule of incentives depicted on a calendar. A reminder
email is depicted in Supporting Information, Figure S2.
No participants opted out of the incentive program. However, some participants
did not record daily steps on some days, either because they failed to wear FitBits, or
because they did not sync their FitBit data with AchieveMint. Other participants may
have worn FitBits only for a brief portion of a given day. We called participants who
failed to record more than 2,000 daily steps on less than all 14 days of the intervention
“attriters.” Table 2 shows the number of attriters and mean pre-intervention daily steps of
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attriters in each experimental group. The salient and control groups did not differ from
each other in attrition rates.
Statistical Analyses
Our outcome variable of interest was daily steps walked post-intervention.
Participants’ daily steps were tracked for two weeks before the intervention and during
the intervention, and for four weeks after the intervention. We tested for evidence of habit
formation by comparing mean daily steps in each group after the end of the intervention
period.
Our statistical analysis strategy was a difference-in-differences approach. Like
other standard difference-in-differences analyses (e.g., Pope and Pope, 2014), our
analyses include covariates for experimental condition, temporal indicators (pre-, during,
and post-intervention), and the interaction of experimental condition and temporal
indicators. We chose difference-in-differences analysis rather than simple comparison of
groups because it is effective at “comparing the time changes in the means for the
treatment and control groups” so that “both group-specific and time-specific effects are
allowed for” (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 148). It therefore enables comparisons between
experimental groups (salient and control) at different times (during, after, and long after
the intervention). The coefficients of interest in regressions of this form are the
interactions of experimental condition and temporal indicators. These coefficients
measure the effect of the experiment at a given time period (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 148).
Importantly, our study uses random assignment to experimental condition, so
experimental groups are the same in expectation. This enables our analysis to avoid many
potential methodological issues that come from using difference-in-differences methods
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to compare groups that have significant underlying differences (Athey and Imbens,
2002).
We use ordinary least squares regressions with fixed effects for all of our
analyses. In order to account for different walking levels on different days (due to
weather, day of week, and seasonality), we include fixed effects for each day observed in
the dataset. It would be natural to include user fixed effects in an analysis like this one in
order to account for different individual activity levels. However, in addition to varying
in overall activity levels, individuals likely vary on their patterns of activity throughout a
given week. For example, some individuals may take a recreational Sunday walk, while
others walk more during the week as part of a commute. Individuals work on different
days and have different exercise and gym attendance habits. In order to account for this
detailed level of individual differences, we employ fixed effects that are more specific
than user fixed effects. We go a step further, and include fixed effects for an interaction
of user with day of the week (Monday, Tuesday, etc.): seven fixed effects per individual.
We also clustered each regression at the user level, to account for possible correlation of
standard errors of users who have unique individual characteristics. This detailed level of
analysis increases our ability to identify treatment effects that are independent of
individual differences.
The following is the regression equation used to estimate the coefficients shown
in Table 3 as part of our difference-in-differences strategy. The regression’s standard
errors were clustered by user.

Equation 1.
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𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼1 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑥𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡
+𝛽1 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
+𝛽2 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛15𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
+𝛽3 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛15𝑎𝑛𝑑28𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
+𝜀𝑖𝑡 .
In this equation, salienti is a 0-1 indicator for whether individual i was in the salient
condition, daytt is a fixed effect for each day included in the data, userxdayofweekit is a
fixed effect for user-day-of-week, and the other variables represent 0-1 indicators for
whether an observation occurred during, soon after, or long after the intervention.
Equation 1 represents a difference-in-differences specification. The 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and
𝛽3 coefficients measure the differences between salient condition subjects and control
condition subjects during, shortly after, and long after the experimental intervention.
Difference-in-differences specifications like this one were designed to identify treatment
effects even when comparing groups that have fundamental differences. When groups
have fundamental differences, there are some potential problems with difference-indifferences analyses. However, in our experiment, salient and control subjects were
randomly assigned to conditions, and the groups are the same in expectation, so our
analyses should avoid the potential problems of comparing fundamentally different
groups using difference-in-differences analyses.
In addition to our primary analyses, which measure the difference between our
experimental groups, we conducted supplemental analyses to compare incentivized
subjects with subjects in a matched holdout group. We selected the matched holdout
group from the same pool of app users that the experimental subjects were selected from
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(AchieveMint users with linked FitBit accounts). There were three exclusion criteria that
we used to select experimental subjects. First, users who had been subjects in a previous,
similar experiment were excluded. Second, users who had a record of opening fewer than
1 email per month from AchieveMint were excluded. Third, users who were above the
70th percentile for historical daily steps taken were excluded. In order to select a holdout
group that closely matched the experimental group in observable characteristics, we
selected AchieveMint users who were excluded only because they had been subjects in a
previous, similar experiment, but who would not have been excluded otherwise (because
they met the criteria for email open rates and historical daily steps). Because they met
both inclusion criteria that were based on observable characteristics, they should be
similar to experimental subjects.
The following is the regression equation used to estimate the coefficients shown
in Table 4 as part of our difference-in-differences strategy. The regression’s standard
errors were clustered by user.
Equation 2.
𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼1 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑥𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡
+𝛽1 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
+𝛽2 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛15𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
+𝛽3 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛15𝑎𝑛𝑑28𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
+𝛽4 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
+𝛽5 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛15𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
+𝛽6 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛15𝑎𝑛𝑑28𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
+𝜀𝑖𝑡 .
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In this equation, inexperimenti is a 0-1 indicator for whether individual i was in the
experiment, salienti is a 0-1 indicator for whether individual i was in the salient
condition, daytt is a fixed effect for each day included in the data, userxdayofweekit is a
fixed effect for user-day-of-week, and the other variables represent 0-1 indicators for
whether an observation occurred during, soon after, or long after the intervention. Like
Equation 1, Equation 2 represents a difference-in-differences analysis strategy. The
matched holdout group was carefully selected so that it would not differ from the
experimental group. Since difference-in-differences analyses can encounter problems
when comparing groups with underlying differences, it is possible that our analyses using
Equation 2 (found in Table 4) are biased. However, our matched holdout group was
selected specifically to be similar to the experimental group in observable characteristics,
so the chances of this bias occurring are small.
Robustness Tests
In addition to the analyses reported here, we conducted a variety of robustness checks on
our results. Specifically, we performed other regressions predicting daily steps, with each
of the following variations in the specification:


clustering level of the standard errors (clustered by user, or clustered by user-dayof-week interaction)



Winsorization at the 99% level, performed by setting step counts above the 99th
step count percentile equal to the 99th percentile value.



dataset (using data on experimental subjects, or experimental subjects plus a
matched holdout group)

We performed eight types of regressions in total, with the following specification details:
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clustered by user, not Winsorized, using data only on experimental subjects
(Table 3)



clustered by user, not Winsorized, using data on experimental subjects together
with the matched holdout group (Table 4)



clustered by user-day-of-week, not Winsorized, using data only on experimental
subjects (Table S1)



clustered by user-day-of-week, not Winsorized, using data on experimental
subjects together with the matched holdout group (Table S2)



clustered by user, Winsorized at the 99% level, using data only on experimental
subjects (Table S3)



clustered by user-day-of-week, Winsorized at the 99% level, using data only on
experimental subjects (Table S4)



clustered by user, Winsorized at the 99% level, using data on experimental
subjects together with the matched holdout group (Table S5)



clustered by user-day-of-week, Winsorized at the 99% level, using data on
experimental subjects together with the matched holdout group (Table S6)

The results of these robustness checks are shown in the Supporting Information in Tables
S1-S6. In each of these models, users in the salient condition take more daily steps than
users in the control condition both during and up to two weeks after the experimental
intervention, with p<.05 for both of these coefficients in each model.
DISCUSSION
In this field experiment, we successfully incentivized exercise for users of a
pedometer tracking app. We also manipulated the salience of offered incentives, and
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differences in reactions to incentives depending on their salience. We found that exercise
incentives can lead to increased daily steps, and increases in daily steps can persist as
habits even after interventions end. Importantly, we found that incentive salience has a
large effect on behavioral reactions to incentives, as well as on habit formation.
Our research contributes to literature on exercise incentives, and especially to
research on forming exercise habits. We found that incentives to exercise were effective
at influencing behavior. We also found that there is evidence of habit formation even
after an incentive that lasted only two weeks. Our research also has implications for
marketing literature, which has extensively studied methods to capture the attention of
customers and the importance of the salience of incentives. Our salience manipulation
was low-cost, and consisted only of emails.
Our study has several limitations. First, we have examined daily exercise, but we
have not recorded the particular activities that subjects participated in, or the intensity of
these activities. Additionally, our subject pool consisted of voluntary users of a
pedometer tracking app. Future research can investigate whether the results of our
research generalize to other subject populations. Finally, we have studied a relatively
short intervention with relatively small incentives. Future studies should investigate the
effects of longer salience manipulations with higher stakes.
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CHAPTER 2 TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Pretreatment characteristics of the study sample reveal no significant differences
at the 0.05 level. This table shows statistics from Jan. 1, 2015, to Jan. 26, 2015. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Attriters are defined as individuals who recorded fewer than
2,000 steps on at least one day before the intervention.
Salient
Mean Daily Steps Walked (Std.
5,224.7 (86.2)
Err.)
Number (%) of Pre-Intervention
364 (35.4%)
Attriters
Mean Pre-Intervention Daily Steps
2,654.4 (185.4)
of Attriters (Std. Err.)
Mean Number of Emails Opened
3.82 (2.51)
Monthly Pre-Intervention
Mean Date of First Opened Email

Aug. 14, 2014 (75.04
days)
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Control
5,386.1 (81.7)
370 (36.0%)
2,623.5 (178.8)
3.93 (2.73)
Aug. 12, 2014 (75.61
days)

Table 2. Mean daily steps of participants in the experiment and email open rates during
and after treatment (standard errors in parentheses). This table shows statistics from Jan.
27, 2015, to March 9, 2015. In two-sample proportion tests, salient and control groups’
attrition rates did not differ significantly at the .05 level during, shortly after, or long after
the experimental intervention. The matched holdout group’s attrition rates was
significantly different from the salient and control groups’ attrition rates, p<.01.
Control

Matched
Holdout

Mean Daily Steps During 5,771.7
Intervention (107.4)

5,582.1
(100.1)

9,800.4
(90.2)

5,359.2
(105.9)
4,586.4
(106.3)

5,204.7
(100.7)
4,612.9
(99.6)

9192.0
(95.9)
8,463.7
(114.7)

Number (%) Who Opened 654
Kickoff Email (63.7%)

0 (not
sent to
control)

0 (not sent
to holdout)

Number (%) who Opened at 889
Least One Reminder Email (86.6%)

0 (not
sent to
control)

0 (not sent
to holdout)

Number (%) of Attriting Users 606
During Intervention (59.0%)

607
(59.0%)

811
(63.9%)

Number (%) of Attrition
3,220
Observations (<2,000 Steps)
(24.1%)
During Intervention

3,152
(23.6%)

3,080
(18.7%)

Number (%) of Attriting Users 1- 656
2 Weeks After Intervention (63.9%)

635
(61.8%)

889
(70.1%)

Number (%) of Attrition
3,810
Observations (<2,000 Steps) 1-2
(28.5%)
Weeks After Intervention

3,651
(27.3%)

3,747
(22.7%)

Number (%) of Attriting Users 3- 961
4 Weeks After Intervention (93.6%)

972
(94.6%)

988
(77.9%)

Number (%) of Attrition
3,302
Observations (<2,000 Steps) 3-4
(40.2%)
Weeks After Intervention

3,120
(37.9%)

3,102
(30.6%)

Salient

Mean Daily Steps 1-2 Weeks
After Intervention
Mean Daily Steps 3-4 Weeks
After Intervention
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Table 3. This table reports coefficient estimates from an ordinary least squares regression
model (see Equation 1) predicting daily steps taken by a given user. Robust standard
errors are clustered by participant-day-of-week and reported in parentheses. The data
analyzed includes all observations of study participants’ daily steps made available to us
by AchieveMint (from January 1, 2015 – March 9, 2015).

(Salient Condition) x (Treatment Period)
(Salient Condition) x (0-2 Weeks PostTreatment)
(Salient Condition) x (3-4 Weeks PostTreatment)
Fixed effects for day of the year (Ndays=68)
Fixed effects for 2,055 users x 7 days of the
week (Nusers-by-days-of-the-week=14,385)
Unique Participants
Observations
R2

Subset

Model 1
331.78**
(105.49)
296.64*
(121.57)
131.54
(138.89)
Yes

Model 2
220.46**
(84.26)
193.87*
(95.37)
105.26
(121.71)
Yes

Yes

Yes

2,055
106,860

2,016
84,855

0.534

0.493
All
participants
who
logged
>2,000
steps on a
given day

All participants
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Table 4. This table reports coefficient estimates from an ordinary least squares regression
model (see Equation 2) predicting daily steps taken by a given user. Robust standard
errors are clustered by participant-day-of-week and reported in parentheses. The data
analyzed includes all observations of study participants’ daily steps made available to us
by AchieveMint (from January 1, 2015 – March 9, 2015).

(In Experiment) x (Treatment Period)
(In Experiment) x (0-2 Weeks PostTreatment)
(In Experiment) x (3-4 Weeks PostTreatment)
(Salient Condition) x (Treatment Period)
(Salient Condition) x (0-2 Weeks PostTreatment)
(Salient Condition) x (3-4 Weeks PostTreatment)
Fixed effects for day of the year (Ndays=68)
Fixed effects for users x days of the week
Unique Participants
Observations
R2

Model 1
192.15
(126.53)
182.97
(190.70)
596.64***
(158.46)
331.78**
(105.48)
296.64*
(121.55)
131.54
(138.86)
Yes

Model 2
68.29
(119.89)
-144.64
(191.29)
229.23
(146.44)
220.65**
(84.02)
195.49*
(95.19)
106.82
(121.32)
Yes

Yes

Yes

3,920
203,794

3,835
165,105

0.279

0.233
All
All
participants,
participants,
>2,000
holdout
steps,
only
holdout
because of
only
previous
because of
participation
previous
participation

Subset
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Figure 1. Mean daily steps taken, differences between salient and control conditions, using raw data, for days before, during, and after
the intervention.
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CHAPTER 2 SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Table S1. This table reports coefficient estimates from an ordinary least squares
regression model (see Equation 2) predicting daily steps taken by a given user. Robust
standard errors are clustered by participant-day-of-week and reported in parentheses. The
data analyzed includes all observations of study participants’ daily steps made available
to us by AchieveMint (from January 1, 2015 – March 9, 2015).

(Salient Condition) x (Treatment Period)
(Salient Condition) x (0-2 Weeks PostTreatment)
(Salient Condition) x (3-4 Weeks PostTreatment)
Fixed effects for day of the year (Ndays=68)
Fixed effects for 2,055 users x 7 days of the
week (Nusers-by-days-of-the-week=14,385)
Unique Participants
Observations
R2

Subset

Model 1
331.78***
(60.90)
296.64***
(64.94)
131.54†
(76.85)
Yes

Model 2
220.46***
(62.16)
193.87**
(65.87)
105.26
(84.28)
Yes

Yes

Yes

2,055
106,860

2,016
84,855

0.533

0.493
All
participants
who
logged
>2,000
steps on a
given day

All participants
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Table S2. This table reports coefficient estimates from an ordinary least squares
regression model (see Equation 2) predicting daily steps taken by a given user. Robust
standard errors are clustered by participant-day-of-week and reported in parentheses. The
data analyzed includes all observations of study participants’ daily steps, as well as the
daily steps of a matched holdout group made available to us by AchieveMint (from
January 1, 2015 – March 9, 2015).

(In Experiment) x (Treatment Period)
(In Experiment) x (0-2 Weeks PostTreatment)
(In Experiment) x (3-4 Weeks PostTreatment)
(Salient Condition) x (Treatment Period)
(Salient Condition) x (0-2 Weeks PostTreatment)
(Salient Condition) x (3-4 Weeks PostTreatment)
Fixed effects for day of the year (Ndays=68)
Fixed effects for users x days of the week
Unique Participants
Observations
R2

Model 1
192.15*
(96.90)
182.97
(159.24)
596.64***
(107.17)
331.78***
(60.93)
296.64***
(64.99)
131.54†
(76.87)
Yes

Model 2
68.29
(111.99)
-144.64
(179.54)
229.23†
(129.24)
220.65***
(62.10)
195.49**
(65.87)
106.82
(84.10)
Yes

Yes

Yes

3,920
203,794

3,835
165,105

0.279

0.233
All
All
participants,
participants,
>2,000
holdout
steps,
only
holdout
because of
only
previous
because of
participation
previous
participation

Subset
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Table S3. This table reports coefficient estimates from an ordinary least squares
regression model (see Equation 2) predicting daily steps taken by a given user. Robust
standard errors are clustered by participant and reported in parentheses. The data
analyzed includes all observations of study participants’ daily steps made available to us
by AchieveMint (from January 1, 2015 – March 9, 2015). Daily step data was
Winsorized at the 99% level (observations of steps about the 99th percentile of steps were
set equal to the 99th percentile).

(Salient Condition) x (Treatment Period)
(Salient Condition) x (0-2 Weeks PostTreatment)
(Salient Condition) x (3-4 Weeks PostTreatment)
Fixed effects for day of the year (Ndays=68)
Fixed effects for 2,055 users x 7 days of the
week (Nusers-by-days-of-the-week=14,385)
Unique Participants
Observations
R2

Subset

Model 1
323.85**
(105.06)
301.62*
(120.78)
112.53
(133.94)
Yes

Model 2
215.31**
(82.83)
208.58*
(93.08)
81.36
(113.32)
Yes

Yes

Yes

2,055
106,858

2,016
84,853

0.548

0.510
All
participants
who
logged
>2,000
steps on a
given day

All participants
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Table S4. This table reports coefficient estimates from an ordinary least squares
regression model (see Equation 2) predicting daily steps taken by a given user. Robust
standard errors are clustered by participant-day-of-week and reported in parentheses. The
data analyzed includes all observations of study participants’ daily steps made available
to us by AchieveMint (from January 1, 2015 – March 9, 2015). Daily step data was
Winsorized at the 99% level (observations of steps about the 99th percentile of steps were
set equal to the 99th percentile).

(Salient Condition) x (Treatment Period)
(Salient Condition) x (0-2 Weeks PostTreatment)
(Salient Condition) x (3-4 Weeks PostTreatment)
Fixed effects for day of the year (Ndays=68)
Fixed effects for 2,055 users x 7 days of the
week (Nusers-by-days-of-the-week=14,385)
Unique Participants
Observations
R2

Subset

Model 1
323.85***
(60.48)
301.62***
(64.27)
112.53
(73.15)
Yes

Model 2
215.31***
(60.97)
208.58**
(64.23)
81.36
(78.73)
Yes

Yes

Yes

2,055
106,860

2,016
84,855

0.548

0.510
All
participants
who
logged
>2,000
steps on a
given day

All participants
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Table S5. This table reports coefficient estimates from an ordinary least squares
regression model (see Equation 2) predicting daily steps taken by a given user. Robust
standard errors are clustered by participant and reported in parentheses. The data
analyzed includes all observations of study participants’ daily steps as well as the daily
steps of a matched holdout group made available to us by AchieveMint (from January 1,
2015 – March 9, 2015). Daily step data was Winsorized at the 99% level (observations of
steps about the 99th percentile of steps were set equal to the 99th percentile).

(In Experiment) x (Treatment Period)
(In Experiment) x (0-2 Weeks PostTreatment)
(In Experiment) x (3-4 Weeks PostTreatment)
(Salient Condition) x (Treatment Period)
(Salient Condition) x (0-2 Weeks PostTreatment)
(Salient Condition) x (3-4 Weeks PostTreatment)
Fixed effects for day of the year (Ndays=68)
Fixed effects for users x days of the week
Unique Participants
Observations
R2

Model 1
246.64*
(110.28)
323.04*
(126.60)
565.70***
(144.29)
323.85**
(105.04)
301.62*
(120.76)
112.53
(133.91)
Yes

Model 2
119.36
(89.20)
29.17
(95.90)
171.05
(115.85)
215.13**
(82.61)
208.45*
(92.86)
81.24
(113.02)
Yes

Yes

Yes

3,920
203,794

3,835
165,105

0.441

0.355
All
All
participants,
participants,
>2,000
holdout
steps,
only
holdout
because of
only
previous
because of
participation
previous
participation

Subset
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Table S6. This table reports coefficient estimates from an ordinary least squares
regression model (see Equation 2) predicting daily steps taken by a given user. Robust
standard errors are clustered by participant-day-of-week and reported in parentheses. The
data analyzed includes all observations of study participants’ daily steps as well as the
daily steps of a matched holdout group made available to us by AchieveMint (from
January 1, 2015 – March 9, 2015). Daily step data was Winsorized at the 99% level
(observations of steps about the 99th percentile of steps were set equal to the 99th
percentile).

(In Experiment) x (Treatment Period)
(In Experiment) x (0-2 Weeks PostTreatment)
(In Experiment) x (3-4 Weeks PostTreatment)
(Salient Condition) x (Treatment Period)
(Salient Condition) x (0-2 Weeks PostTreatment)
(Salient Condition) x (3-4 Weeks PostTreatment)
Fixed effects for day of the year (Ndays=68)
Fixed effects for users x days of the week
Unique Participants
Observations
R2

Model 1
246.64**
(77.49)
323.04***
(80.04)
565.70***
(90.44)
323.85***
(60.48)
301.62***
(64.27)
112.53
(73.15)
Yes

Model 2
119.36
(80.86)
29.17
(82.22)
171.05†
(98.83)
215.13***
(60.86)
208.45**
(64.09)
81.24
(78.57)
Yes

Yes

Yes

3,920
203,794

3,835
165,105

0.441

0.355
All
All
participants,
participants,
>2,000
holdout
steps,
only
holdout
because of
only
previous
because of
participation
previous
participation

Subset
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Figure S1. Kickoff email.
Users in the informed condition received the following email on Jan. 26, 2015 (the day
before incentives began):
Subject Line: New Program to Encourage You to Walk (earn Bonus Points)
Message: Tomorrow is the first day of a two week walking program designed in
partnership with experts at Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania to get you
moving. Tomorrow and every day after that for the next two weeks, we'll encourage you
to walk by multiplying the points you earn for walking by 40.
To push you to walk more, your bonuses from AchieveMint over the next two weeks will
follow this schedule:

We will be sending you reminders every two days about upcoming bonuses.
We hope that this program will help you improve your walking habits!
For the next two weeks, we'll be emailing you every other day about these bonuses. If
you don't want to receive these emails, please click here.
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Figure S2. Reminder emails.
Users in the informed condition received the following reminder email every other day
(day 1, day 3,…, day 13) during the 14-day incentive program.
Subject Line: Program to Increase Walking (Earn Bonus Points Today and Tomorrow)
Message: You are in the middle of a two week walking program designed in partnership
with experts at Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania to get you moving. Today
and tomorrow, we'll encourage you to walk: all points you earn for walking will be
multiplied by 40.
To push you to walk more, your bonuses from AchieveMint over the next two weeks will
follow this schedule:

For the duration of this two week period, we'll be emailing you every other day about
these bonuses. If you don't want to receive these emails, please click here.
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Figure S3. Histogram of daily step counts for all participants on all days. Only showing
observations greater than 0 steps and less than 3,000 steps.
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